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I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
A. Purpose 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate causal factors 
inducing investment in education, specifically investment in Maryland 
grade schools during the segregated schooling era. The period covered 
will be from 1924 through 1955. Many theoretical models have been 
developed which describe the educational investment process. Each 
presents causal relationships among variables. The goal of this 
dissertation is to derive a method to empirically test the validity of the 
relationships among variables as set forth in the theoretical models using 
the Maryland school district data, and to develop new theoretical models 
which help to explain the empirical results. 
B. The Dissertation Layout 
Chapter II will discuss in detail the models of educational 
investment as presented in the literature. The chapter consists of three 
parts; an introduction, an in-depth literature review, and a section 
which summarizes the theoretical presentation of the models and presents 
the expected causal relationships among variables in each of the models. 
Chapter II builds a case for the use of the empirical approach taken in 
chapter III. 
Chapter III delves into the vector-autoregressive approach to the 
investigation of the causal relationships among variables relating to the 
public school choice. This chapter is made up of five sections: an 
introduction, a presentation of the theoretical model of causality, a 
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section on the data and data transformations, a comparison of the 
empirical results and the theoretical predictions, and conclusions. The 
empirical results from chapter III support the idea that whites may have 
been willing, in an era of segregated schooling, to invest in black 
schools with the hope of reaping future benefits to a better-educated 
black labor force. 
Anytime investment in public schools is discussed, a discussion about 
private school investment should also be included. This is a necessity 
because investment in private schools can be thought of as a substitute 
for investment in public schools. 
Chapter IV investigates the causal relationships among all relevant 
variables in the public-private school choice. This chapter consists of 
four sections. Along with a general introduction, an in-depth review of 
the literature on the public-private school investment choice is included. 
A third section presents an empirical look at this choice using the same 
methodology as chapter III. The final section summarizes the findings of 
this chapter. 
Chapter V investigates Myrdal's paradox, a paradox which has not been 
formally addressed in an empirical or theoretical setting before. The 
first section of this chapter gives a general introduction to Myrdal's 
paradox. The second section explores the literature which deal with 
segregated schools and the racial differences which exist in the 
educational services provided. Theoretical models supporting the 
empirical findings in chapter III are presented and discussed in the third 
section. Chapter V ends with conclusions about the theoretical approach 
to solving Myrdal's paradox. 
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To conclude the investigation, chapter VI incorporates the idea of a 
taste for discrimination into a more "traditional" static model. Two-
stage least squares regression analysis is employed to the static model. 
The chapter consists of five sections; an introduction, the presentation 
of the model, a description of the data used in the empirical analysis, 
the empirical findings, and a conclusion. 
General conclusions from chapter III through VI are presented in 
chapter VII. This chapter also describes limitations to the research and 
future directions the research might take. Following chapter VII are the 
Bibliography, the Acknowledgements, and the Appendix. 
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II. EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENT: MODELS FROM THE LITERATURE 
h. Introduction 
When considering the investment in educational services, there are 
five models economists have explored. These include the human capital 
investment model, the voter behavior or public choice model, the 
quantity/quality (fertility behavior) model, the model of Tiebout 
migration, and the capitalization model. The goal of these models is to 
explain how and why local governments or households invest in education 
and to pinpoint the factors affecting their decisions. 
Before delving into a specific empirical example of the investment in 
education, it is necessary to review the relevant literature dealing with 
these different approaches. The next section will cover this review. The 
goal of such a review is to better understand each approach and the 
structural differences which distinguish them. Following the literature 
review is a section which specifies the theoretical models and summarizes 
the predictions of each of these. 
B. Literature Review 
1. Human capital investment model 
The first approach is that of investment in human capital. Human 
capital is a concept which dates back to Adam Smith. The concept was 
reintroduced into the literature by Schultz [1960] and Becker [1962] and 
subsequently discussed in many other articles and texts. Schultz [1960] 
views humans as inputs in the production process and that any additional 
knowledge or skill gained by humans has a positive effect on labor 
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productivity. Early empirical tests of the investment model were usually 
stated in terms of rates of return or lifetime earnings. Internal rates 
of return were computed using measures of earnings at different 
educational levels, years of experience, and costs of schooling. Both 
Schultz and Becker have taken this approach by addressing investment in 
human capital in terms of social and private rates of return. 
Since the original studies, additional work has expanded the measured 
outcomes beyond rates of return or lifetime earnings. Measures of human 
capital investment have included occupational choice and fertility choice. 
Additionally, the inputs into human capital production were expanded to 
incorporate parental inputs (e.g., family income or some measure of 
wealth, parental educational background, and measures of school quality). 
Edwards [1975] derived a model for school enrollment rates. Her 
model includes the enrollment rate as a function of median income, 
educational attainment (adults), the unemployment rate (18-year olds), 
expenditure per pupil, the proportion of the population living in rural 
areas, the proportion of blacks, and a compulsory school dummy. 
The empirical results for combined races showed that school 
expenditures had a positive and significant effect on enrollment, implying 
that an increase in school quality would cause an increase in human 
capital investment. Edwards also reported positive signs on median income 
and male (father's) educational achievement coefficients. The coefficient 
on the educational attainment of females (mother) was found to be 
negative. 
The findings for blacks, when run separately, were markedly different 
from the combined sample. The coefficient on the educational attainment 
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of females was found to be positive, while that of males had mixed signs. 
Median income had a negative impact on enrollment rates. However, as with 
the combined sample, expenditures exhibited a positive coefficient, but 
the coefficient was not significantly different from zero. Edwards noted 
that her model for nonwhites produced poor adjusted values and that the 
conclusions drawn from this particular analysis should therefore be 
considered very tentative. 
Orazem [1983] developed a model of human capital investment using 
attendance as a measure of the intensity of investment in human capital. 
In a static setting, attendance was regressed on teacher experience, 
length of school term, value of school equipment and property per pupil, 
student/teacher ratio, a proxy for the opportunity cost of schooling, and 
a measure of average property value. 
Empirical results for whites and blacks showed that the coefficient 
on the opportunity cost of education had a negative sign, while property 
value had a positive sign. For whites, the coefficient on property value 
was significant, while that on opportunity cost was not. The significance 
was reversed for blacks. Quality of education, in the form of teacher 
experience, had a positive effect on attendance for both blacks and 
whites. The coefficient on the length of the school term was negative for 
whites and positive for blacks. Also, the student/teacher ratio was found 
to significantly lower attendance for blacks, but increase it for whites. 
Gustman and Pidot [1973] investigated the simultaneity of the 
enrollment and expenditure decisions. They concluded that the 
simultaneous interaction of these two decisions is critical. An increase 
in expenditures per pupil leads to an increase in enrollments in their 
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model. They also concluded that lower expenditures per pupil are 
predicted when enrollments rise. Increased expenditures caused by an 
increase in enrollments would be a human capital notion. However, the 
inverse effect of enrollments on expenditures would represent a public 
choice or voter behavior notion, which will be considered next. 
In a recent journal article. Card and Krueger [1992] modeled the 
effect of school quality on the rate of return to education. Their sample 
included males born between 1920 and 1949 in all states (except Alaska and 
Hawaii) and the District of Columbia. They considered quality variables 
such as pupil/teacher ratio, term length, teacher wage, education of 
parents, per capita income of parents, the percentage of male teachers, 
teachers' years of education, teachers' years of experience, high school 
grads in cohort, college grads in cohort, and the percentage enrolled in 
private schools. They categorized these school quality variables into the 
following groups: family background, teacher quality, educational 
attainment, and private schools. They found that pupil/teacher ratio and 
teacher wage had the anticipated signs and were significant. All of the 
remaining quality variables were found to be insignificant. 
2. Voter behavior or public choice model 
A second model of educational investment is the voter behavior model. 
"While economic interests play an important role in shaping the underlying 
demand for these services, the institutional structure of political 
decision-making may have significant effects on the way this demand is 
expressed." [Romer and Rosenthal, 1982, p. 556] 
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The median-voter hypothesis was first introduced by Hotelling [1929]. 
The premise of this model is that communities are heterogeneous with 
regard to incomes, prices, and preferences and that the demand for 
locally-provided public services depends on the demand of the median 
voter. 
"The standard median-voter theory applied to educational expenditures 
predicts that a given locality's educational expenditures per student 
correspond to the 'most-preferred' expenditure of the voter with the 
median ideal point." [Romer and Rosenthal, 1982, pp. 559-560] The model 
specified by Romer and Rosenthal expresses the most preferred expenditure 
as a function of median income, tax price (the ratio of median housing 
value to total assessed value of real estate times average daily 
membership (an enrollment measure)), and the number of students in the 
median household. Their empirical results indicate a positive coefficient 
on income and negative coefficients on family size and tax price. 
Similar results were reported by Gramlich and Rubinfeld [1982] when 
they modelled demand for per capita public expenditures. Their model 
included median income, median tax price (ratio of median residential 
value to total value), public wage (starting salary for teachers), 
population, and grants. Using macro data for 83 Michigan counties, 
positive coefficients were obtained for the income and population 
variables, while public wage and tax price exhibited negative 
coefficients. 
To determine educational expenditures, McMahon [1970], considered a 
model of zero excess demand. To formulate his model, he assumed three 
choices: the demand for educational services, the costs of education 
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services, and the local tax behavior. The joint solution of these three 
equations results in a function for educational expenditures in reduced 
form. In the model, demand (expressed in terms of educational 
expenditures) is a function of school age children as a percent of the 
population, children not attending, the density of the community, and 
disposable personal income. Average salaries of teachers, the 
student/teacher ratio, and density are factors in the cost equation. 
Local revenues generated by assessed value of property are related to the 
desired educational expenditures and state and federal aid. 
McMahon estimates his reduced-form expenditure model using both 
cross-sectional and time-series data. In the cross-sectional regressions, 
expenditures were found to be positively affected by the proportion of 
children in the population, the number of pupils in the school district, 
state aid, and personal income. The proportion of children not attending, 
the student/teacher ratio, federal aid, the density of the population, the 
assessed property value, and the proportion of nonwhites in the population 
all exerted a negative influence on expenditures. For the time-series 
regression, the proportion of children, the student/teacher ratio, the 
number of pupils in the school district, the assessed property value, 
federal and state aid, and unemployment all had positive coefficients. 
Only the proportion of children not attending and teachers' salaries 
exhibited negative coefficients. 
McMahon concluded that the major determinants for the cross-sectional 
data are the proportion of children in the population, the proportion of 
children not attending, and personal income. The major determinants for 
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the time-series data include those of the cross-sectional data as well as 
the student/teacher ratio and state aid. 
Ladd [1975] also modeled educational expenditures in the context of a 
median-voter model. Her model uses expenditures per pupil as a function 
of median family income, residential property value per pupil, the 
proportion of the assessed property tax base that is residential, state 
aid measures, the proportion of children in public and private schools, 
the proportion of the population below the poverty level, and the 
proportion of the population holding professional or technical jobs. 
She estimated her model using ordinary least squares on a sample of 
78 Boston communities. Income, the value of residential property per 
pupil, state block grants, the proportion of children in public schools, 
the proportion of the population below the poverty levels, and the 
proportion of the population holding technical or professional jobs all 
had a positive effect on per pupil expenditures. Negative coefficients 
were found on the residential portion of the tax base (tax price), and the 
proportion of children in private schools. 
An interesting model of educational expenditures developed by Megdal 
[1983] demonstrates that no matter what type of agenda control exists in a 
community, a median-voter result will hold true. Her model consists of. 
median family income, residential value, tax price, grant variables, the 
proportion of the population below the poverty level, and the percentage 
increase in enrollment from the previous year. Like Ladd, Megdal's 
ordinary least squares empirical results for New Jersey communities found 
positive coefficients on residential value, median income, and the 
proportion of the population below the poverty level. Likewise, both 
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studies agree on the inverse relationship between the tax price and 
educational expenditures. One additional finding of the Megdal study was 
that educational expenditures seem to be inversely related to increases in 
enrollments. 
3. Ouantitv/oualitv model 
At about the same time as his work on human capital, Becker 
introduced another model which draws on both human capital theory and 
household production theory. This model is known as the quantity/quality 
model. Here the demand for educational services is an outcome of parental 
utility maximizing behavior in which utility from children depends upon 
the number of children (quantity) and the quality per child. In this 
case, the quality per child typically refers to the extent of educational 
investment (such as educational expenditures) or the total number of years 
of education per child. Becker hypothesized that there is an important 
inverse relationship between quantity and quality per child. 
The idea was incorporated into a household decision-making model 
presented by Becker and Lewis [1973] and Becker [1981]. In their model, 
the demand for children (quantity) and the quality of children are 
functions of the shadow price of the number of children, the shadow price 
of the quality, the prices of other goods, and income. Quantity and 
quality are inversely related in the demand functions. The shadow price 
of quality depends on the number of children in that an increase in the 
number of children raises the shadow price of quality which, in turn, 
causes a decrease in the demand for quality. Also, the shadow price of 
the number of children is a function of quality. So, an increase in 
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quality increases the shadow price of the number of children.- and hence, 
results in a decrease in the demand for children. 
Although not very empirical in nature, Tan and Haines' [1984] 
investigation of fertility and education concluded that in developed 
countries there is a tradeoff between quantity and quality of children. 
They based their conclusion on historical evidence. Using enrollment 
rates as a measure of educational participation. Tan and Haines tracked 
the historical relationship between fertility and enrollment rates for 
five developed countries. 
For the United States, the historical results back the inverse 
relationship predicted by the Becker/Lewis model. If enrollments serve as 
the quality variable and birth rates as the quantity variable, an increase 
in enrollments (quality) would increase the shadow price of quantity, and 
hence decrease the demand for quantity (birth rate). Likewise, an 
increase in the birth rate (quantity) would cause the shadow price of 
quality to rise and decrease enrollments (quality). 
Similar results were reported by Anker [1978] in his empirical work 
relating birth rates to enrollments. Anker's approach was to use two-
stage least squares with cross-national data of developing countries. He 
hypothesized the birth rate to be a function of parental education, 
employment level of females, school enrollment, life expectancy, and the 
proportion of the population employed in agriculture. Enrollment rates 
were defined to be functions of income, birth rates, parental education, 
and the proportion of the population employed in agriculture. 
All signs confirmed the a priori expectations. Enrollments and 
employment levels of females negatively affected birth rates, while 
illiteracy, the proportion of the population employed in agriculture, and 
life expectancy all had a positive influence. Birth rates, the proportion 
employed in agriculture, and illiteracy all had a negative impact on 
enrollments. Income had a positive effect. 
A more recent study by Hanushek [1992] also investigated the 
tradeoffs between the number of children in a given family and their 
quality (scholastic performance). He assumed that a student's level of 
achievement at any point in time is a function of three sets of inputs. 
These sets include family, schools, and other exogenous factors. To test 
his assumptions, Hanushek used value-added models estimated in log-log 
form. The log-log form was used to easily measure elasticities. The 
achievement measures used were raw scores from the Iowa reading 
comprehension test and the Iowa vocabulary test. The empirical results 
showed that both achievement measures would decrease if more children were 
added to a family. Also found (from family inputs) to significantly 
affect achievement was parental income. Whether a mother works or not and 
whether or not a particular family unit has a father were found to have no 
significant impact on achievement. Significant from school inputs was 
teacher experience. 
4. Tiebout migration model 
Investment in educational services has also been viewed from the 
Tiebout point of view. The hypothesis set forth by Tiebout [1956] is that 
consumer-voters will migrate to communities best fitting their local 
public good preferences. He claimed that there is a difference in the way 
public goods are provided at the local level relative to the central 
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level. Central government will take the consumer-voters' preferences as a 
given and adjust the provision of public services to meet such 
preferences. Local governments basically have the level of public 
services set and are unable to deviate from that level. Hence, consumers 
seek out preferred communities or consumers are said to "vote with their 
feet." 
Richard Cebula has done extensive empirical research on migration and 
the provision of local public services. He is one of few who has 
specifically addressed the relationship between educational expenditures 
and migration. [Cebula, 1977] He surmised that since educational 
expenditures tend to be the largest component of a local government's 
budget, local commitment to education might have a Tiebout-like effect and 
cause migration. He also felt that if the quality of education or 
household demand for education influenced the location of a household, it 
would also be of concern once a location was selected and a median-voter 
type effect might occur. In other words, he believed there was a 
possibility of reverse causality. 
To investigate this possibility, Cebula developed a two-equation 
system. The model for in-migration consists of growth in public education 
spending per full-time student, per capita income, the unemployment rate, 
number of days with a temperature below 32 degrees, and per capita 
property tax level. The model for the growth rate of educational spending 
uses in-migration, the growth rate of per capita personal income, growth 
of federal education funding (per full-time student), and the inflation 
rate. 
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To correct for simultaneity between in-migration and the growth in 
educational expenditures, the two-equation system was estimated using two-
stage least squares. It was found that the growth rate of educational 
expenditures and per capita income exhibited positive coefficients in the 
in-migration equation. Unemployment, number of days below 32 degrees, and 
property tax level, however, were found to have negative coefficients. 
All coefficients in the expenditure growth model were found to be 
positive. 
The results indicate that in-migration and educational expenditures 
are highly interdependent. This backs Cebula's notion that causality 
could be in both directions. The results offer support for the Tiebout 
hypothesis, but they also add a new twist in that, "... in the case of 
public education, there is actually a dynamic process wherein the 
consumer-voter acts further to influence local government policies in this 
new community of residence." [Cebula, 1977, p. 120] So the Tiebout 
hypothesis may be relevant in getting people to a particular community, 
but once there, a median-voter mechanism can take effect. 
5. Capitalization model 
The empirical Tiebout literature has concentrated more on tax and 
expenditure capitalization than on migration. Oates [1969] was one of the 
first to address the potential effects of property taxes and public 
spending on property values. He felt that 
if consumers, in their choice of locality of 
residence, do consider the available program of public 
services, we would expect to find that other things 
being equal (including tax rates), gross rents (actual 
or imputed) and therefore property values would be 
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higher in a community the more attractive its package 
of public goods. In contrast, if local expenditure 
programs have no impact at all on locational 
decisions, we would not expect local property values 
to depend on spending variables... [Gates, 1969, p. 
959] 
Oates' empirical model consists of the median home value as the 
dependent variable with tax rate, expenditures per pupil, a distance 
measure, median number of rooms per house, the percent of houses built 
since 1950, median income, and percent of families with income less than 
$3,000 serving as explanatory variables. While tax rates and distance 
were found to have negative coefficients, expenditures and the remaining 
variables exhibited positive coefficients. 
The size of the coefficients suggests that, for an 
increase in property taxes unaccompanied by an 
increase in the output of local public services, the 
bulk of the rise in taxes will be capitalized in the 
form of reduced property values. On the other hand, 
if a community increases its tax rates and employs the 
receipts to improve its school system, the 
coefficients indicate that the increased benefits from 
the expenditure side of the budget will roughly offset 
(or perhaps even more than offset) the depressive 
effect of the higher tax rates on local property 
values. [Oates, 1969, p. 968] 
In this light, Oates concluded that his results backed the Tiebout 
model. With offsetting effects, the property tax is a pure benefits tax 
because it serves as a user charge for services. Also, because property 
values were affected by expenditures, Oates concluded that consumers do 
tend to shop around for communities that reflect their preferences for 
public services. Consumers do seem to be willing to pay higher prices for 
housing in communities which offer higher-quality local public services. 
Edel and Sclar [1974] claimed that Oates' study was one of 
disequilibrium, so they extended the approach taken by Oates by 
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considering supply adjustment. They felt that supply had not adjusted to 
long-run equilibrium in his model, because capitalization would have been 
zero if adjustment to competitive equilibrium had occurred. "Taxes cover 
costs simply, and there is neither a net increment in land values from the 
presence of the service nor a decrease from the presence of the tax." 
[Edel and Sclar, 1974, p. 946-947] 
The empirical results of Edel and Sclar show that the tax rate is 
negatively capitalized into property values, while school expenditures 
tend to be positively capitalized. To have a true Tiebout equilibrium, 
the coefficients on variables such as tax rates and expenditures should, 
over time, tend towards zero. They found this to be true with regard to 
educational spending, but not with some public services. 
Hamilton [1976] also addressed disequilibrium as the reason for 
Oates' capitalization results. He claimed that any correlation between 
property values and expenditure levels could only be due to short supply. 
In equilibrium, no correlation should exist and expenditures and taxes 
should not be capitalized into property values. 
Edel, Sclar, and Hamilton conclude the following: 
If the property tax is a benefit tax that is 
equivalent to a head tax, and all households receive 
their preferred level of public services, then there 
is no advantage to residing in a high-expenditure, 
low-tax jurisdiction — residents pay for what they 
get. Thus, variations in demand should not be a 
determinant of property value differences across 
communities, any more than the variations in 
expenditures on private goods across communities 
should affect property values. ...The capitalization 
of fiscal variables is an indication of disequilibrium 
— that is, certain types of communities are in 
oversupply or undersupply in the metropolitan area 
relative to long-run equilibrium. [Mieszkowski and 
Zodrow, 1989, p. 1127] 
An alternative to the property tax being viewed as a benefit tax is 
what is called the "new view. " This "new view" is that property taxes are 
distortionary and redistributive taxes on capital and the burden of these 
taxes falls on the owners of capital. In this view, the effect of an 
increase in the property tax is to reduce the rate of return on capital. 
This view also concludes that the tax on capital is independent of any 
benefits received. 
Brueckner [1979] abandons the Tiebout hypothesis in his study of 
capitalization. He employs a bid-rent model to test for the efficiency of 
the level of public services provided. He assumes that communities are 
heterogeneous and that property taxes have a distortionary effect (new 
view) on housing consumption. The sign on the expenditure coefficient 
determines the efficiency in his model. If increased expenditures do not 
affect property values, then the provision of public services is 
efficient. If, however, an increase in the expenditure level causes an 
increase in property values, then public services are less than the 
efficient level. Likewise, a negative sign on the expenditure variable 
would indicate overprovision. 
Using cross-sectional data of residents in northeast New Jersey in 
1960 who typically commuted to work in New York City, Brueckner modeled 
the median value of housing. He regressed the median value of housing on 
this consumption level of housing, median income, community expenditures on 
public goods, business profits, community population, commuting distance, 
and proxies for the percentage of older dwellings in a community and the 
percentage of those consumers below a certain income level. Brueckner's 
two-stage least squares results found positive and significant 
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coefficients on size of house, median income level, and business profits. 
Educational expenditures, commuting distance, and the percentage of older 
homes in the community all had a significant negative impact on the value 
of housing. From these empirical results, Brueckner concluded that the 
negative coefficient on public goods implied that there was overprovision 
in the communities in the sample. Further, a reduction in the level of 
public good provision would cause an increase in property values. 
When the empirical capitalization literature is searched for a 
definitive answer to differentiate between the new view and the benefit 
view, no conclusion is reached. Both views imply that some degree of 
capitalization will occur. So establishing that capitalization exists is 
not proof as to whether the benefit view or the new view of a property tax 
is more correct. 
Mieszkowski and Zodrow [1989] suggest that one empirical test might 
be performed to distinguish between the two views. The test would be to 
determine whether the capitalization resulting from an increase in the 
property tax decreases land values or leaves them unchanged. 
'Under the benefit view, such increases would result in 
capitalization of the associated fiscal differentials; 
however, ... a central tenet of the benefit view is 
that such increases should not change the aggregate 
value of land in the community. In contrast, under 
the new view, the capital out-migration induced by an 
increase in the property tax should result in lower 
land values in the community. [Mieszkowski and Zodrow, 
1989, p. 1131] 
C. Summary and Implications of the Models 
Although the models investigated in the literature all deal with the 
provision of educational services, each type of model has structural 
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differences from the next. Each is somewhat different in its objective 
function, its constraints, the endogenous variables, and the optimizing 
agent. This section will present a simple theoretical version of each 
model to better summarize the distinctions between the models. Bach 
theoretical model simplifies to a derived demand for or supply of 
educational services. This section will also summarize the variables 
which seem to be used the most in each of the models and the expected 
relationships between the variables of interest. 
1. Human capital investment model 
In a human capital investment model it is the parents who are the 
maximizers of the objective function subject to the family's budget 
constraint. The objective function would be the utility of the family as 
a function of the quality of the child, other goods consumed, adult time 
spent in leisure, and other parameters. The quality of the child is a 
function of the quantity of schooling they receive and a function of 
exogenous factors affecting the quality of schooling. The constrained 
maximization model would be set up with an objective function (equation 
2.1) and a budget constraint (equation 2.2). 
(2.1) 
( 2 . 2 )  
U = f{Q(E,XQ),Xo,TL;Z) 
wT + I = PgE + PoXo+ wTjl 
where: 
Q = quality of the child 
E = quantity of schooling received 
Xq = exogenous factors affecting school quality 
Xq = all other goods 
Tl = adult time spent in leisure 
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Z = a vector of other parameters 
w = wage rate 
T = total time 
I = nonlabor family income 
Pjj = price of education 
Pq = price of all other goods 
This model would lead to a derived demand for education (equation 
2.3) that would be a function of nonlabor income, the price of education, 
school quality, the price of all other goods, the wage rate (the price of 
time), and a vector of other parameters including tastes and preferences. 
E = f(X,PQ,Xg,Pq, w; Z) (2.3) 
In addition, similar reduced-form specifications can be derived for Xq and 
TL" 
Given that the derived for education function looks like- this for the 
human capital investment model, it predicts that enrollments or attendance 
(measures of intensity of investment in education) are influenced by 
variables such as income (or other measures of wealth) and educational 
expenditures (or other measures of quality). If one is to invest in human 
capital, the goal is to experience a good rate of return on the 
investment. To do so, one must take advantage of an increase in 
educational expenditures, if this increase is perceived as an increase in 
quality, by increasing enrollments. Increases in income would also be 
predicted to have a positive influence on enrollments. These anticipated 
signs (from both theory and the empirical work discussed) are summarized 
in column one of Table 2.1 found at the end of this chapter. 
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2. Voter behavior or public choice model 
Consumers are assumed to vote according to their preferences and 
independently of each other in a voter behavior or public choice type of 
model. Each consumer-voter has a utility function which depends on the 
level of private consumption and the level of a publicly-provided good 
(education). The consumer-voter maximizes the utility function (equation 
2.4) subject to a budget constraint (equation 2.5). The demand function 
which results from this constrained maximization will reflect the 
consumer-voter's preferences for the publicly-provided goods. The 
following is a typical model of voter behavior where a median-voter 
assumption is made and the publicly-provided good is education. 
U = U(X,E,n;Z) (2.4) 
Ym = PxXn + tWn, (2.5) 
where; X = per-capita amount of private consumption 
E = expenditure on education 
n = the number of persons in the household 
Z = a vector of other parameters 
Ym = income of median voter 
Pjj = price of private consumption 
t = community tax rate 
= locally taxable holdings of the median voter 
The resulting derived demand for education (equation 2.6) is a 
function of the income of the median voter, the price of private 
consumption, the tax rate (the price of education), size of the household, 
and a vector of parameters including tastes and preferences. 
E = f (Yn,,Px»t,n;Z) ( 2 . 6 )  
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The demand for education would be expressed in terms of the level of 
educational expenditures selected by the consumer-voters. 
The voter behavior or public choice model would predict that income, 
property values, and population (birth rate or the number enrolled) would 
positively influence the level of educational expenditures in a given 
community. Tax price would be found to be a negative factor in the 
expenditure decision. These conclusions, based both on theory and 
previous empirical results, are summarized in column two of Table 2.1 
found at the end of this chapter. 
3. Quantity/quality model 
The basis for the quantity/quality model is that when consumers 
maximize their utility, quantity and quality both exert a positive 
influence on utility. However, they appear to be substitutes in the 
utility function. A simple utility function relating the quantity and 
the quality of children is the form the objective function takes in the 
quantity/quality model. The objective function would further include 
consumption of all other goods. The household would maximize the 
objective function (equation 2.7) subject to the household budget 
constraint (equation 2.8). The model can be summarized as follows. 
U = U(n,q,X;Z) (2.7) 
Ï = Pnqng + ( 2 . 8 )  
where: 
n = the number of children 
q = the quality per child 
X = all other goods 
Z = a vector of other parameters 
Y = household income 
Pjjq = price of child services 
Pjj = price of all other goods 
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Prom this constrained maximization, the derived demand for quality 
(equation 2.9) is a function of income, the price of all other goods, the 
price of child services, and a vector of all other parameters which 
includes tastes and preferences. A similar derived demand for quantity 
results as well. 
q = f(ï,Px,Pnq;Z) (2.9) 
The variables of importance in the quantity/quality models seem to be 
enrollments or expenditure levels (measures of intensity of investment in 
quality), birth rates, and income. If enrollments or expenditure levels 
are viewed as quality variables, then they should demonstrate inverse 
relationships with birth rates, the quantity variable. Other socio­
economic variables such as income, education of parents, and the 
employment of females may also exert an influence. Such results are 
summarized in Table 2.1 at the end of this chapter. 
4. Tiebout model 
Tiebout theory predicts that consumers-voters, when they maximize 
utility, migrate to communities offering the local public services they 
desire. In other words, they tend to separate themselves in or migrate to 
communities of like consumers. Each consumer-voter maximizes a utility 
function (equation 2.10) consisting of publicly-provided goods, housing, 
and all other goods. Consumer's are taxed by the local government to 
provide the publicly-provided goods they desire. This fact is taken into 
account in the individual consumer-voter's budget constraint (equation 
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2.11). The model also incorporates the local government's constraint for 
the provision of these publicly-provided goods (equation 2.12). A typical 
Tiebout model would be as follows. 
U = U(E,H,X;Z) (2.10) 
Y = PnH(l+t) + PjjX (individual) (2.11) 
tNPjjH = NPgE (government) (2.12) 
where: E = quantity of publicly-provided education (number enrolled) 
H = quantity of housing 
X = all other goods 
Z = a vector of other parameters 
y = household income 
Pjj = price of housing 
P^ = price of all other goods 
Pg = price of education per child (expenditure per enrolled 
child) 
t = tax rate 
N = community population (number of households) 
Each consumer-voter's individual vote is determined through the 
maximization of the above model with respect to the consumer's choice 
variables; E,H, and X. If the first-order conditions were solved from 
this constrained optimization, the derived demand functions for both 
publicly-provided educational services and housing (equations 2.13 and 
2.14) would be functions of income, the price of housing, the price of the 
publicly-provided goods (the expenditure level per pupil enrolled), the 
local tax rate, and a vector of other parameters such as tastes and 
preferences. 
E - f(y,Pjj,Pjj,Pg,t;Z) 
H = f(Y,PH,Px,PE,t;Z) 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
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Tiebout models of migration and provision of educational services 
would predict that the quantity of educational services demanded measured 
in terms ,of a variable such as enrollments (a measure of in-migration) 
would be positively influenced by educational expenditures or the cost of 
education per child enrolled, income, and negatively influenced by tax 
prices. These predictions are summarized in Table 2.1 found at the end of 
this chapter. 
5. Capitalization model 
Since the capitalization model assumes that a community's capital 
stock is or is not affected by the expenditure level of services provided 
to households within the community, the value of the community's capital 
must be the objective function. Consumers maximize their utility and 
select their optional level of nonpublic goods given the level of housing 
services, the level of public good expenditures, and their income. Local 
government would want to maximize the present value of the capital in its 
community (both household and business) subject to tax revenues raised 
from taxing the capital stock. The model would look much like Brueckner's 
[1979] bid-rent model. 
V = (Ï - X(H,E,y))/(0 + t) = f(H,E,t,Y) (2.15) 
tEf(Hi,E,t,Y) + t7r/(0 + t) = C(E,n) (2.16) 
where; 
V = present value of a house 
y = household income 
X = numeraire private good 
H = housing services 
E = educational expenditure per household 
0 = 1/(1), ti) is the constant of proportionality 
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t = tax rate 
TT = aggregate business profit gross of rent 
C = cost function for education 
n = number of households 
From equation 2.16 a function for the property tax rate can be derived 
(equation 2.17). 
This equation gives the tax rates which would allow for the provision of 
educational services at the level E, given the value of the remainder of 
the variables. Going one step further, if equations 2.15 and 2.16 are 
combined, equation 2.18 results. 
Equation 2.18 can then be used to determine how a change in any one 
variable will affect the property value when the community maintains a 
balanced budget. From this model it can be concluded that a change in 
either gross business profits or housing services would cause property 
values to change in the same direction. Increasing the tax rate would 
cause property values to fall. A change in income or a change in 
educational expenditures would be found to have an ambiguous effect. 
Tiebout theory, in the context of a capitalization model, would 
conclude that there should be no relationship between educational 
expenditures and property values. Increased educational expenditures may 
t = f (H,E,Y,n,7r) (2.17) 
Vi = f (Hi,E,t(H,E,Y,n,7r),Y) (2.18) 
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cause rises in property values, but simultaneous increase in property 
taxes will cause decreases in property values. With the benefit view of 
taxes, these changes in property values would be predicted to be 
offsetting. In other words, no changes in property values should be 
evident. This result is show in Table 2.1 found at the end of this 
chapter. 
If, however, a capitalization model were considered in light of the 
new view of property taxes, the predicted relationship between 
expenditures and property values may not be zero and may be hard to 
predict. Some literature indicates that if there is a direct relationship 
between the two, there may be underprovision of services. Likewise, an 
inverse relationship would predict an overprovision. However, it is 
possible to conclude that an increase in property taxes alone would have a 
negative effect on property values. These results are summarized in Table 
2.1 at the end of this chapter. 
D. Conclusions 
After searching relevant literature dealing with the five different 
approaches that try to explain reasons why consumers invest in education 
or cause educational expenditures, one can conclude that each model may 
contribute some particular insight. However, one can also conclude that 
no one model, when considered alone, ever best describes the investment in 
educational services. 
From the five models, certain variables seem to be used routinely. 
The human capital models tend to use enrollments or attendance. Voter 
behavior models concentrate their attentions on educational expenditures. 
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Fertility behavior models use birth rates and enrollments or expenditures. 
The Tiebout models employ expenditures, enrollments, and tax rates. 
Capitalization models focus on educational expenditures, tax rates, and 
property values. The Table 2.1 summarizes some of the anticipated signs 
of the variables in each of the models. 
Many other variables have been included in educational investment 
models. However, educational expenditures, attendance or enrollments, 
birth rates, and property values seem to prevail. For this reason, these 
four variables will be used in the empirical work to follow in chapter 
III. 
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Table 2.1. Expected relationships between variables 
Models 
3EXP 
8ENR 
aSNR 
aEXP 
aEXP 
aeiR 
3BIR 
aEXP 
aEXP 
apRo 
apRo 
aEXP 
asxp 
a TAX 
asNR 
aBiR 
aeiR 
aENR 
aENR 
a INC 
aEXP 
a INC 
aENR 
a TAX 
a PRO 
aTAX 
aENR 
a PRO 
Human Median Quantity Tiebout Capitalization 
Capital Voter Quality Migration Tiebout General 
EXP = educational expenditures 
SIR = birth rates 
TAX = tax price 
ENR = enrollments/attendance 
PRO = property values 
INC = incomes 
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III. CAUSAI. RELATIONSHIPS: TBB PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 
A. Introduction 
As outlined above, several models have been advanced to analyze 
investment in education. A common criticism of these models is that they 
do not allow for the possibility of "feedback effects." In response, 
several authors have used two-stage least squares in their empirical work. 
Although two-stage least squares may correct for feedback among any two 
variables, problems may still exist if more than two variables are 
endogenous. In addition, two-stage estimation may miss the full impact if 
long-run responses differ from short-run responses. 
The goal of this investigation is to let the data speak for 
themselves with no a priori restrictions imposed by a single model. The 
previous discussion showed that models of educational investment have 
suggested certain causal relationships among variables. This 
investigation will test whether or not these relationships hold true. 
If there are feedback effects or if reverse causality exists among 
variables, one way to capture these effects would be to employ a simple 
vector autoregressive (VAR) model to the data. The VAR model could then 
be used to test for Granger-Sims type causality among the variables. This 
model would also allow for the generation of impulse responses which would 
give a feel for the dynamic response of variables to changes or "shocks" 
in the system. Both Winegarden [1988] and Macunovich and Easterlin [1988] 
employed VAR in their analyses and found Granger causality beneficial in 
explaining economic phenomena. 
32 
B. The Theoretical Model of Causality 
Granger [1969] defines causality as follows. If 
o2(x|0) < o2(x|0-?), (3.1) 
then Ï is said to cause X, because we can better predict X when all 
information is used (0), rather than when all information except Y is 
used. Granger also says that feedback exists if 
o2(x|û) < o2(x|0-Y) (3.2) 
o2{y|û) < o2(X|0-X). (3.3) 
He then defines a simple causal model based on these definitions. 
His model is defined for X^ and two stationary time series having mean 
zero. 
m m 
+ ®t (3-4) 
m m 
^t =jîi°jXt-j +.%idj?t-j + f^ t (3-5) 
In these equations, and are assumed to be two uncorrelated white-
noise series. Y^ is said to cause X^ if bj is not zero. Likewise, X^ is 
said to cause Y^ if Cj is not zero. If both bj and Cj are not zero, then 
feedback or reverse causality is said to exist between X^ and Y^. 
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C. The Data 
1. General description 
Maryland school district data are employed for the period 1924 to 
1955, a period in which segregated schooling existed. Maryland provides 
good choice for data usage since each county in the state of Maryland is 
distinct school district. For most states, the differentiation between 
counties and school districts would be unclear. With each county being a 
school district, many problems are avoided in that the demographic data 
for any given county apply to that school district. 
The data set used is a cross-sectional time series with 32 years of 
data for 23 white school systems and 22 black school systems. The data 
concentrate on elementary schools, covering grades 1 through 8, 
Elementary school data were chosen because parents are the primary 
decision makers for their children during these years and because all 
counties provided both black and white grade schools. During this time 
period some counties did not have their own high schools for black 
children. Due to this fact, Maryland high school enrollment and 
attendance figures were thought to reflect choices from more than one 
county and, therefore, inappropriate for this analysis. 
The variables selected for use in this analysis are variables which 
seem to take a prominent role in the literature. These variables include 
real expenditures per pupil attending, average daily attendance per 
thousand in the population (county), birth rate per thousand in the 
population (county), and real assessable property per thousand in the 
population (county). The data (with the exception of the birth rate) were 
taken from the Annual Reports of the state of Maryland Board of Education. 
The birth rate data were taken from an unpublished vital statistics table 
received from officials of the State of Maryland Board of Education. The 
variables are defined in Table 3.1 and sample statistics (sample means and 
standard deviations) are shown in Table 3.2. 
2. Stationaritv 
The asymptotic properties of the VAR require that the data be 
stationary. So, before starting any modeling, it is important to ensure 
that the data are stationary. Stationarity implies that the mean and 
variance of a variable remain constant over time. Prior to testing, plots 
were made for each of the four variables being investigated for various 
counties. The plots showed that both real expenditures and attendance had 
definite trends (positive and negative respectively). The birth rate fell 
during the Depression and then increased during the post-war period, 
mimicking national trends. Real assets rose from 1924 through 1934, then 
fell until 1947 when they began to rise again. From visual inspection, it 
was decided that the data needed to be transformed before stationarity 
could be maintained. Autocorrelation functions for a few counties were 
also calculated for the relevant variables. The autocorrelation functions 
confirmed the need for transformations in the data. 
For ease of interpretation, the data were first transformed by taking 
the natural log. Then, because all of the data sets showed some type of 
trend or cycle to them, correction for trend was incorporated. Also, to 
take into account any time-invariant county influence on the variables, 
correction was made for the county-specific means. To make these 
corrections, OLS regressions were run for each of the variables. The 
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Table 3.1. Variable definitions^ 
Variable Definition 
REXPPA (REXD) 
ATTPTH (ATTD) 
RPT (RPTD) 
ASSETPTH (ASSD) 
total current expenses (in real terms) per pupil 
attending (as measured by average daily attendance) 
average daily attendance per thousand in the 
population (county) 
live births per thousand in the population (county) 
total assessment taxable at full rate (in real terms) 
per thousand in the population (county) 
^Variable names in parentheses refer to the transformed variables. 
Table 3.2. Sample statistics 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
White sample: 
REXPPA 
ATTPTH 
RPT 
ASSETPTH 
110.79 
114.32 
20.55 
1440.14 
34.69 
23.37 
4.11 
470.41 
Black sample: 
REXPPA 
ATTPTH 
RPT 
ASSETPTH 
82.19 
139.55 
25.80 
1446.12 
43.58 
2 2 . 8 2  
6.29 
477.68 
Combined sample: 
REXPPA 
ATTPTH 
RPT 
ASSETPTH 
96.81 
126.65 
23.11 
1443.06 
41.81 
26.32 
5.91 
473.98 
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explanatory variables in each of the regressions were a constant, year 
(trend), and county dummies (22 for white samples and 21 for black 
samples). The residuals from each of the regressions were saved to be 
used in the vector autoregressions because they would have constant mean 
and variance. These new variables were named REXD, ATTD, RPTD, and ASSD. 
Variable definitions are included in Table 3.1. 
To ensure that the mean and variance of each of the newly created 
series were constant, autocorrelation functions (acf's) were calculated 
and plotted for these residuals. "Stationary autoregressive (AR) 
processes have theoretical acf's that decay or 'damp out' toward zero." 
[Pankratz, p. 55] The plots confirmed that the data were now stationary -
the acf's died down towards zero. 
3. The causal model 
To test four variables for causality, a model with four time series 
was constructed much like that of Granger. The general unrestricted model 
is as follows: 
00 00 00 GO 
REXDt =^E^agREXDt_g +^Z^bgATTDt_g + E^CgRPTD^.g +^E^dgASSDt_g + (3.6) 
GO 00 00 00 
ATTDt =J^egREXDt_g +J^fgATTDt_g +^E^ggRPTDt_s +J^hgASSDt_g + (3-7) 
00 GO 00 00 
RPTDt = E igREXDt_g + E jgATTDt.g + I kgRPTD^.g + E IgASSD^.g + (3.8) 
0—1 S^l 8®1 8®1 
CO 00 00 00 
ASSDt =^E^mgREXDt_g +^E^ngATTDt_g + E^OgRPTD^-g + E^PgASSD^.g + (3.9) 
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or more generally, 
00 
ït = + "t (3.10) 
where is an (n x 1) vector, Y^-s an (n*lags x 1) matrix of lagged 
variables, Ag is an (n x n*lags) matrix of constants, and U^. is an (n x 1) 
uncorrelated innovation vector. The number of endogenous variables is n. 
If, in any of the equations, any of the sets of coefficients (other 
than the one on the lagged dependent variable) are significantly different 
from zero, then there is causality from those variables to the dependent 
variable. For example, if the bg coefficients are jointly found to be 
significantly different from zero, then attendance is said to cause real 
expenditures. Also, if both the bg and eg coefficients are significantly 
different from zero, it can be concluded that there is a feedback effect 
between real expenditures and attendance. 
4. Lao length tests 
The theoretical model involves infinite lags which are not 
empirically tractable, so some truncation level of the lags must be found 
(i.e., the order of the VAR). To determine the optimal lag length for the 
VAR, lag length tests were performed. A procedure suggested by Sims 
[1980] was followed. He used a chi-square statistic which compares a VAR 
of a particular order to a VAR of higher order. The former is viewed as a 
restricted version of the latter. The statistic generated is as follows. 
(T-C)[log det CVR - log det CVU] - x^n (3.11) 
T is the number of observations, C is the number of variables in each 
unrestricted equation, CVR and CVU are the two covariance matrices of 
residuals, and n is the degrees of freedom (the total number of 
restrictions). 
Lag length tests were performed on the combined sample using 
consecutive lags. The results are reported in Table 3.2. Unfortunately, 
these results were not conclusive. They did reveal a of lowest value 
(and a marginal significance level of 0.023) when the 8th lag was added. 
It was therefore decided that a lag length of 7 was appropriate. This 
determination was not based on the lag length test exclusively, but on 
other criteria as well. A lag length of 7 has some intuitive appeal in 
that most children start elementary school between the ages of 6 and 7, so 
the impact on the educational system of people having children would be 
felt 6 to 7 years after the child's birth. For most of the sample period, 
child labor laws allowed children to work at age fourteen so that the 
seven-year period also spans the bulk of the period for which parents 
would make schooling choices for their children. 
Even though the statistical and intuitive choice for the lag length 
may be open to criticism, the results of the model, when run for various 
lag lengths, gave consistent relationships among the relevant variables. 
For simplicity, all results reported from this point forward are for the 
vector autoregressive model of order 7. 
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Table 3.2. Testing lag length for the vector autoregressive system^ 
lags T T-C q log det. CVR log det. CVU %2 
1 vs. 2 690 682 16 -21.8123 -21.5725 163.58 
2 vs. 3 667 655 16 -21.9223 -21.7525 111.27 
3 vs. 4 644 628 16 -21.9339 -21.8396 59.25 
4 vs. 5 621 601 16 -22.0737 -21.8714 121.60 
5 vs. 6 598 574 16 -22.3095 -22.1393 97.67 
6 vs. 7 575 547 16 -22.4746 -22.2870 102.60 
7 vs. 8 552 520 16 -22.4489 -22.3929 29.15 
8 vs. 9 529 493 16 -22.5759 -22.4138 79.95 
9 vs. 10 506 466 16 -22.6003 -22.4964 48.41 
10 vs. 11 483 439 16 -23.1443 -23.0132 57.53 
11 vs. 12 460 412 16 -24.0350 -23.6348 164.87 
®The critical value of the chi-square test with 16 degrees of freedom 
is 32.0 at the .01 level of significance and 26.3 at the .05 level of 
significance. 
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D. Empirical Results 
1. Regression procedure 
Using the cross-sectional, time series data corrected for the mean, 
trend, and county fixed effects, the model described above was run using 
RATS (Regression Analysis for Time Series). This statistical package 
allows for easy calculation of impulse responses and variance 
decomposition which will be discussed later. The system of four equations 
can be regressed equation by equation using ordinary least squares. If 
all of the equations of the model have the same right-hand side variables, 
ordinary least squares, when applied equation by equation, provides 
consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates. The estimates are 
equivalent to Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression method. [Theil, p. 
302] 
The model was run three times; once for the white sample, once for 
the black sample, and once for the combined sample. Since the data used 
were from an era of segregation, one question to address would be whether 
there is any information gained by looking at the samples separately or 
whether there is no statistical significance between the separate samples 
and the combined sample. One would anticipate that there would be 
differences between the separate black and white samples versus looking 
exclusively at the combined sample. To test each variable for -
significance between the separate samples versus the combined sample, F-
statistics were calculated. For real expenditures, attendance, and birth 
rates, the F-statistics (2.42, 2.37, 2.24 respectively) were significant 
at the .01 level implying that the separate samples were significantly 
different from the combined samples for these variables. The F-statistics 
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for real assets was equal to 1.15 implying that there was no statistical 
significance between samples. This is consistent with the fact that the 
real assets variable was calculated on a per capita basis, but not 
distinguished by race. Even though the F-statiatica proved that there was 
information to be gained by considering separate samples, results for the 
separate samples as well as the combined sample are reported in this 
analysis. 
2. Direction of causalitv 
The regression package reports coefficients and their t-ratios for 
each of the lagged variables. However, these individual coefficients do 
not have much importance in this particular type of model since 
colinearity among the lagged variables makes it difficult to interpret any 
one coefficient in isolation. To get the overall interrelationships among 
the variables, F-tests were used. The F-tests determine whether the 
coefficients on the lagged values of a particular variable (as a whole) 
are significantly different from zero. The F-test is of the form: 
{^c^c ~ ^u^u)/P 
(r'r,,/(N-4p) - "P'N-4P <^-^2) 
where r^ is the (N x 1) vector of residuals from the constrained model 
(the first term in the numerator is the SSR of the constrained model), r^ 
is the (N X 1) vector of residuals from the unconstrained model (the 
second term in the numerator is the SSR of the unconstrained model), p is 
the order of the vector autoregression (the lag length), 4p is the number 
of regressors in the unconstrained model, and N is the number of 
observations. 
If the P-statistic is significant, that variable has an influence in 
determining, or is said to cause, the left-hand side variable of that 
equation. If the F-test for some variable A in an equation with left-hand 
side variable B is significant and the similar F-test shows B significant 
in the equation for A, then causality runs in both directions or a 
"feedback effect" between A and B is said to occur. 
The results of the F-tests are reported in Table 3.3. The white 
sample showed all four variables to be significant (at the .05 level) in 
determining each other. For the black sample, all variables were 
significant (at the .05 level) in determining real expenditures, 
attendance, and real assets. However, real expenditures and attendance 
were not significant in the determination of the birth rate. In the 
combined sample everything was significant with the exception of 
attendance being insignificant in the birth rate equation. 
From these F-tests, it can be concluded that causality runs in both 
directions among most variables, or that a feedback effects are present. 
The only exception to this for the combined sample would be that birth 
rate causes attendance, but attendance does not cause the birth rate. 
Also, in the black sample, birth rate causes real expenditures and 
attendance, but real expenditures and attendance do not cause birth rate. 
3. Impulse responses and sign of causality 
With the direction of causality determined, it is appropriate to 
determine the sign of causality when causality exists. Signing can be 
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Table 3.3. F-Statistics for white, black, and combined samples^ 
Independent 
variable REXD 
Dependent variable 
ATTD RPTD ASSD 
white sample: 
REXD 
ATTD 
28.86 
(.4034E-07) 
5.10 
(.1260E-04) 
6.37 
{.3696E-06) 
239.87 
(.4034E-07) 
3.76 
( .5432E-03) 
4.75 
( .3382E-04) 
4.03 
( .2568E-03) 
10.25 
(.4034E-07) 
RPTD 5.26 
(.7866E-05) 
16.26 
(.4034E-07) 
46.52 
(.4034E-07) 
5.72 
( .2178E-05) 
ASSD 3.17 
(.2727E-02) 
4.30 
(.1207E-03) 
6.52 
( .2533E-06) 
160.82 
(.4034E-07) 
Black sample; 
REXD 
ATTD 
RPTD 
ASSD 
85.17 
(0 .00 )  
3.24 
( .2232E-02) 
2.76 
(.7904E-02) 
5.83 
(.1597E-05) 
3.29 
(.1960E-02) 
201.98 
(.lllOE-15) 
6.30 
(.4093E-06) 
2.60 
(.1209E-01) 
0.76 
(.6218) 
0.91 
(.5018) 
18.62 
(.lllOE-15) 
4.92 
(.2112E-04) 
4.66 
(.4497E-04) 
4.16 
(.1829E-03) 
2.13 
( .3945E-01) 
234.76 
( .2220E-15) 
Combined sample: 
REXD 
ATTD 
RPTD 
ASSD 
122.06 
(.4034E-07) 
5.41 
(.4124E-05) 
4.76 
(.2790E-04) 
11.51 
(.4034E-07) 
7,23 
(.5757E-07) 
452.85 
(.4034E-07) 
18.96 
(.4034E-07) 
6.51 
(.1912E-06) 
2.51 
(.1468E-01) 
1.75 
( .9409E-01) 
60.69 
(.4034E-07) 
9.96 
(.4035E-07) 
8.36 
(.4090E-07) 
12.48 
(.4934E-07) 
5.99 
( .7658E-06) 
426.97 
(.4034B-07) 
^Significance level in parentheses. The critical value of F(7,n) at 
the .05 significance level where n = 547, 522, 1097 respectively for the 
white, black, and combined samples, would lie somewhere between 2.09 
(F(7,120)) and 2.01 (F(7,oo)). 
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accomplished by simulating the system's response to one-time shocks in 
each of the variables. To simulate the system's responses, impulse 
response functions were generated. These functions generate dynamic 
responses to shocks in each of the variables. Since the possibility of 
the residuals being correlated across equations exists, Sims [1980] 
suggests that it is best to orthogonalize them. The procedure described 
below was followed. 
If S is the positive definite symmetric covariance matrix of the 
residuals, U^, then it can be factorized, using Choleski decomposition, 
into SS' such that S is lower triangular. This matrix S will depend on 
the ordering of the rows in S (i.e., the ordering of the variables). A 
new matrix of orthogonalized innovations, V^, can be created such that 
= S~^U^ where is NID(0,1) since E{V^) = 0 and Var{V^.)=I. If both 
sides are premultiplied by S, then SV^ = U^. If is then plugged into 
the general expression (equation 3.10) it yields 
CO 
Yt = Z: AsYt-s + SVt. (3.13) 
s=l 
This equation can then be used to simulate responses to one-time, unit 
shocks in any one of the variables, since the orthogonalized innovations 
are found in the vector and have unit variance. If the real 
expenditures variable is first in the vector, a shock to some component 
of real expenditures that exclusively affects real expenditures would be 
the first element in (the first element in the vector would be a one, 
all else zeros). This one-time, unit shock combined with the S matrix 
generates a shock in real expenditures. So even though the elements of 
the vector are unitless, elements of the SV^ vector would have units. 
In this case the units would be real dollars. 
As mentioned above, the ordering of the variables can make a 
difference in the dynamic response of the system to any one shock. A 
shock in the first variable is assumed to have an immediate impact on the 
remaining variables in the system. The size of the impact depends on the 
strength of the correlation among the variables. A shock in the last 
variable impacts only itself immediately. 
Since the ordering of the variables could be significant in the 
impulse responses, the ordering was done from what was considered to be 
the most important variable to the variable with the least importance 
(i.e., what was thought to have the most immediate impact on the system to 
what was thought to have the least impact). Real expenditures and 
attendance were thought to be the most important, so the following 
ordering used was: real expenditures, attendance, the birth rate, and 
real assets. A second ordering was tried (e.g., attendance, real 
expenditures, the birth rate, and real assets) and the qualitative and 
quantitative results were not altered substantially. It was anticipated 
that such a second ordering would not make much difference in the results 
because the correlation between residuals was quite small. 
The impact of a one standard deviation shock in each of the variables 
on the other variables, as well as on themselves, were plotted for the 
white, black, and combined samples. These plots can be found in the 
Ap p e n d i x ,  F i g u r e s  1 - 1 2 .  
Because the responses to shocks may exhibit cycles that lead to 
positive and negative values for different time periods, it is difficult 
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to sign the responses. For this reason, it is useful to sum the impulse 
responses of a given variable over time. This gives an overall dynamic 
impact (sign and magnitude) of a shock. Summing the impulse responses 
over time would be equivalent to summing the area under the impulse 
response curve of a particular variable over time. For instance: 
T 
gives the impact of a one standard deviation shock in real expenditures on 
the birth rate over time periods 1 through T when aj^/...,a^ are the 
impulse values of the birth rate generated by a shock in real expenditures 
for years 1 through T. 
During the time period investigated, truancy laws required children 
to attend school up to the age 14. Because children would typically enter 
school (grade 1) at age 6 and could possibly drop out after age 14 (grade 
8), it would seem appropriate to calculate the impact of any shock over 
time periods 1 through 5 and also over time periods 1 through 14. In 
addition, this study only incorporates grades 1 through 8. These results 
are reported in Table 3.4 and are discussed in Section 5 in conjunction 
with the results of the dynamic elasticity measures derived in the next 
section. 
4. Elasticities of responses 
From the summation of the impulse responses another useful 
calculation can be made, namely that of a dynamic elasticity measure. 
Although no other VAR literature has employed such an idea, in this 
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Table 3.4. Summation of the impulse responses, T = 14, for white, black, 
and combined samples^ 
Sum of the impulses 
Shock 
variable REXD ATTD RPTD ASSD 
White sample: 
REXD 0.1055 
(0.1360) 
-0.0763 
(-0.0328) 
-0.1142 
(-0.0829) 
0.1638 
(0.1001) 
ATTD -0.0461 
(0.0045) 
0.1292 
(0.1745) 
-0.0101 
(0.0224) 
0.1133 
(0.1412) 
RPTD 0.0615 
(-0.0133) 
0.0479 
(0.0144) 
0.2585 
(0.2023) 
-0.0639 
(-0.0220) 
ASSD -0.0972 
(-0.0385) 
-0.0459 
(-0.0065) 
0.0185 
(-0.0126) 
0.2330 
(0.2227) 
Black sample; 
REXD 0.2955 
(0.2143) 
0.0070 
(-0.0361) 
-0.0552 
(-0.0395) 
0.0912 
(0.0650) 
ATTD 0.0500 
(0.0318) 
0.3279 
(0.2035) 
-0.0319 
(0.0265) 
0.1477 
(0.1068) 
RPTD -0.0051 
(0.0169) 
0.0777 
(0.0128) 
0.2495 
(0.2442) 
0.0489 
(0.0019) 
ASSD -0.2478 
(-0.0722) 
-0.1222 
(-0.0035) 
-0.1303 
(-0.0356) 
0.2511 
(0.2695) 
Combined sample; 
REXD 0.2006 
(0.1868) 
-0.0265 
(-0.0330) 
-0.0834 
(-0.0639) 
0.1359 
(0.0845) 
ATTD -0.0034 
(0.0155) 
0.2323 
(0.1998) 
-0.0244 
(0.0273) 
0.1322 
(0.1215) 
RPTD 0.0508 
(0.0102) 
0.0892 
(0.0135) 
0.2752 
(0.2350) 
-0.0025 
(-0.0136) 
ASSD -0.2153 
(-0.0670) 
-0.1161 
(-0.0065) 
-0.0744 
(-0.0265) 
0.2444 
(0.2538) 
= 5 in parentheses. 
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particular situation such a measure is very useful and appropriate. This 
measure is useful in the sense that it indicates how responsive any one of 
the variables is to an initial shock in any one of the variables over 
time. 
By definition, an elasticity measure is the percent change in one 
variable relative to a percent change in some other variable (unless the 
own elasticity is of importance). Given that the data are in natural 
logs, a change in any one variable (i.e., a change in the natural log) 
relative to a change in any other variable would, by definition, be an 
elasticity measure as laid out in equation 3.15. 
A In y In yi - In yo % A y 
— = = (3.15) 
A In X In X2 - In Xg % A x 
The shock in any one variable would be the denominator of the 
elasticity formula. The value of this shock would be the initial value of 
the impulse response function for that variable, since the value is 
assumed to be zero before the shock, the change in the natural log of that 
variable goes from zero (In xq) to the initial value of the impulse 
response function (In Xj) and hence, a percentage change (%Ax). In other 
words, the denominator of the above expression is In x^. 
The numerator for the dynamic elasticity measure would be obtained by 
summing over time the impulse responses of the variable responding to the 
initial shock. Again, the initial value of this variable is assumed to be 
zero, so the numerator becomes the sum of the impulse responses over the 
time period desired. 
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The final form the dynamic elasticity formula takes is expressed in 
equation 3.16. 
A In y E In yi. 
—— = (3.16) 
A In X In x^ 
Using this formula, dynamic elasticities were calculated for shocks in all 
of the variables and the resulting responsiveness in the variable itself 
and in the other variables. These results are reported in Table 3.5. 
Notice that the initial shocks in each of the variables (in percentage 
terms) are not the same. (The values of these shocks are shown in 
parentheses beside the shock variables in the table). For example, a 
typical random shock in say real expenditures for the white sample is 
7.4%, while a typical random shock in attendance in the same sample is 
only 3.9%. 
From the dynamic elasticity measures some interesting things can be 
found. The magnitude and signs on the cross-elasticities provide useful 
information about the relationships among the four variables of interest. 
These findings are discussed in the next section. 
5. Empirical findings vs. theoretical predictions 
This section compares and contrasts this study's empirical findings 
to the predications based on theory and based on previous empirical work. 
Although separate sections could be devoted to the empirical results of 
the impulse responses and the dynamic elasticity measures, it seems more 
appropriate to discuss these topics jointly. The signs of the impulse 
response values (reported in Table 3.4) and the dynamic elasticity values 
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Table 3.5. Dynamic elasticities due to typical random shocks for white, 
black, and combined samples, T = 14® 
Dynamic elasticities 
Shock variable 
(value) REXD ATTD RPTD ASSD 
White sample: 
REXD (.074) 1.43 -1.03 -1.55 2.22 
(1.84) (-0.44) (-1.12) (1.36) 
ATTD (.039) -1.17 3.29 -0.26 2.88 
(0.12) (4.44) (0.57) (3.59) 
RPTD (.083) 0.74 0.58 3.13 -0.77 
(-0.16) (0.17) (2.45) (-0.27) 
ASSD (.055) -1.77 -0.84 0.34 4.24 
(-0.70) (-0.12) (-0.23) (4.06) 
Black sample: 
REXD (.084) 3.52 0.08 -0.66^ 1.09 
(2.55) (-0.43) (-0.47) (0.77) 
ATTD (.049) 1.03 6.75 -0.66^ 3.04 
(0.65) (4.19) (0.54) (2.20) 
RPTD (.121) -0.04 0.64 2.06 0.40 
(0.14) (0.11) (2.01) (0.02) 
ASSD (.066) -3.77 -1.86 -1.98 3.82 
(-1.10) (-0.05) (-0.54) (4.10) 
Combined sample: 
REXD (.081) 2.46 -0.33 -1.02 1.67 
(2.29) (-0.40) (-0.78) (1.04) 
ATTD (.045) -0.07 5.12 -0.54^ 2.91 
(0,34) (4.40) (2.08) (2.76) 
RPTD (.106) 0.48 0.84 2.59 -0.24 
(0.10) (0.13) (2.21) (-0.13) 
ASSD (.062) -3.48 -1.87 -1.20 3.95 
(-1.08) (-0.11) (-0.43) (4.10) 
®T=5 in parentheses. 
^Not jointly significantly different from zero at the .05 level in 
Table 3.3. 
(reported in Table 3.5) will be the same. The difference in these values 
is that the impulse response values are reported in "levels" (the amount 
by which the variable changed) and the elasticity values are reported in 
relative percentages. Both tables demonstrate the exact same conclusions. 
It is, however, easier to discuss and interpret the empirical findings in 
terms of the dynamic elasticity values. The elasticity results are 
discussed in terms of a dynamic impact of the shock variables over 14 
years. The values for T=5 are also reported (in parentheses). 
A shock in real expenditures would be expected to cause attendance to 
rise due to increased returns to human capital investment or because of 
Tiebout migration. The median-voter model would predict that real 
expenditures would rise due to a shock in attendance. The two cross-
elasticity measures for the attendance variable and the real expenditure 
variable are both negative and very close to one in value in the white 
sample (-1.03 and -1.17 respectively). This would imply that a typical 
shock in either variable would cause an opposite and almost equal response 
in the other variable (in percentage terms). In that sense, real 
expenditures and attendance are almost perfect substitutes for one another 
in the white sample. This may be true in that greater expenditures 
(better quality) could give students more knowledge per day and they could 
obtain the same overall amount of knowledge by attending fewer days. 
The same was not true in the black sample. Response of attendance to 
a real expenditure shock was positive, but very inelastic (0.08). Also, 
the response of real expenditures to an attendance shock was almost 
unitary elastic and positive (1.03) rather than negative as in the white 
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sample. In this case, the idea of real expenditures and attendance being 
substitutes for one another does not hold true. 
In the combined sample, both cross-elasticity measures for attendance 
and real expenditures were negative, but inelastic (-0.3 and -0.07 
respectively). Again, the idea of expenditures and attendance being 
perfect substitutes for one another would not hold as in the white sample. 
The Becker-Lewis theory implied that there was a trade-off between 
the quantity and the quality of children. This idea is most clearly 
supported in the white sample in that a positive shock in real 
expenditures caused an elastic negative response in the birth rate (-
1.55). The birth rate did not, however, have a like impact on real 
expenditures. Real expenditures rose as a result of a shock in the birth 
rate, but the response was inelastic (0.74). Although this result is 
somewhat inelastic, the median-voter model would have predicted that the 
birth rate would have a positive impact on real expenditures. In the 
black sample the birth rate responded negatively to a shock in real 
expenditures, but the response was inelastic (-0.60). As in the white 
sample, the birth rate had little impact on real expenditures (-0.04). In 
the combined sample the birth rate showed a negative unitary elastic 
response to the real expenditure shock (-1.02) and real expenditures 
showed a positive inelastic response to the birth rate (0.48). These 
results back the predictions of both the median-voter model and the 
Becker-Lewis quantity/quality model. 
A shock in real assets caused elastic negative responses in real 
expenditures (black: -3.77, combined: -3.48), attendance (black: -1.86, 
combined: -1.87), and the birth rate (black: -1.98, combined: -1.20) in 
both the black and the combined samples. An elastic negative response was 
also seen in the white real expenditures (-1.77), but white attendance and 
the white birth rate had inelastic responses with values that were 
negative and positive respectively (-0.84 and 0.34). One explanation for 
the negative sign on real expenditures might be that persons perceive the 
increase in property values as an increase in the tax price and a median-
voter type response results. 
The most intriguing result of the cross-elasticity measures was the 
response of real assets to shocks in attendance. In all samples, real 
assets showed very elastic positive responses to increases in attendance. 
Although not quite as dramatic in value, real assets did show positive 
elastic responses to real expenditures in all samples as well. 
These results are intriguing in that real assets or property values 
do appear to increase when there is more spending on education in a 
community or when more children are attending school in the community. 
There could be many possible reasons for property values increasing due to 
a better-educated community. Among these reasons could be the fact that 
better quality education or more education could cause the future labor 
force to be better educated and therefore enhance the value of capital in 
that community. Give that both the white and the black samples 
demonstrated that education did affect real assets, incentive did exist to 
invest in the education of both blacks and whites, even in an era of 
segregation. The idea that incentive did exist to invest in education of 
blacks and whites alike will be further addressed in chapter V. 
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6. Decomposition of variance 
With causality, the sign of causality, and the elasticity of the 
responses investigated, decomposition of variance was performed. Variance 
decomposition gives the percent of the variance of a particular variable 
due to own innovations and the innovations in other variables. 
The extent of exogeneity or endogeneity can also be determined from 
the variance decomposition. A variable tends to be exogenous if its 
variance is due to, or can be explained almost exclusively by, its own 
shocks. 
Given the assumptions used to generate the impulse responses, the 
attendance component of the variance decomposition for the birth rate (the 
proportion of the variance in the birth rate which can be explained by 
attendance) would be calculated as indicated in equation 3.17. 
T 
E b2 
t=l t 
(3.17) 
T T T T 
E a2 + E b2 + E c2 + E d2 
t=l t t=l t t=l t t=l t 
This is the sum of the squared birth rate impulse responses due to a one 
standard deviation shock in attendance (b^) relative to the sum of the 
squared birth rate impulse responses due to one standard deviation shocks 
in each of the variables (a^, b^, c^, and d^). Likewise, similar 
calculations could be made for any of the variables. 
As with the impulse responses, the periods of interest would be 5 
years and 14 years. The variance decomposition for each variable after 5 
years and after 14 years is reported in Table 3.6. These results are 
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Table 3.6. Variance decomposition after 14 years for white, black, and 
combined samples^ 
Percentage 
due to RBXD 
Variable 
ATTD RPTD ASSD 
White sample: 
REXD 73.65 
(88.96) 
6.60 
(3.83) 
12.00 
(11.54) 
17.33 
(16.14) 
ATTD 6.50 
(4.10) 
75.30 
(93.66) 
4.28 
(1.95) 
24.23 
(24.80) 
RPTD 11.57 
(1.91) 
12.40 
(1.90) 
75.31 
( 8 6 . 1 1 )  
9.08 
(0.93) 
ASSD 8 .28  
(5.03) 
5.71 
(0 .61)  
8.41 
(0.40) 
49.36 
(58.12) 
Black sample: 
REXD 69.26 
(85.47) 
4.15 
(3.29) 
3.35 
(2.11) 
7.55 
(9.26) 
ATTD 2.50 
(2.67) 
77.75 
(95.27) 
4.72 
(2,93) 
15.20 
(13.04) 
RPTD 2.05 
(2.12) 
6.03 
(0.76) 
81.89 
(93.07) 
3,23 
(0.39) 
ASSD 2 6 . 2 0  
(9.75) 
12.07 
( 0 . 6 8 )  
10.04 
(1.89) 
74.01 
(77.32) 
Combined sample: 
REXD 69.70 
(86.53) 
2.59 
(2.78) 
6.21 
(5.05) 
11.11 
(12.02) 
ATTD 1.80 
(1.77) 
75.66 
(95.57) 
4.17 
(1.96) 
19.28 
(18.02) 
RPTD 3.19 
(1.54) 
10.43 
(0.93) 
82.20  
(91.86) 
4.65 
(0.39) 
ASSD 25.31 
(10.16) 
11.32 
(0.72) 
7.42 
(1.13) 
64.96 
(69.57) 
^After 5 years in parentheses. 
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reported having used the impulse responses with ordering real 
expenditures, attendance, birth rate, and real assets. Again, the 
ordering should be insignificant if there is little correlation among the 
residuals. 
For the white sample, real expenditures, attendance, and the birth 
rate exhibited some degree of exogeneity. They explained between 73 to 75 
percent of their own variance even after 14 years. Real assets for the 
white sample were found to be quite endogenous. After 14 years, only 49 
percent of the variance could be explained by itself. Real expenditures 
and attendance were found to contribute approximately 17 and 24 percent 
respectively to the variance in real assets. This result would imply that 
investment in education, either through expenditures or through attendance 
would have a significant impact on the property values in a given 
community. 
For the black sample, real assets appeared to be most highly 
influenced by other variables. Even though attendance and real 
expenditures did explain some of the variance in real assets, 74 percent 
was still due to itself even after 14 years. Real assets explained 26 
percent of the real expenditure variance. This was significantly higher 
than the 8 percent in the white sample. Both attendance and the birth 
rate were found to be quite exogenous for the black sample. 
When the samples were combined, attendance and the birth rate 
remained quite exogenous. Even though real expenditures explained 
approximately 69 percent of their own variance, 25 percent was due to real 
assets. Also, real assets were influenced by both real expenditures and 
attendance as was demonstrated in the white sample. 
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From the variance decomposition, if one were to rank the variables 
from the most exogenous to the least exogenous, the following would 
result. For both the white sample and the combined sample the most 
exogenous (after 14 years) would be the birth rate followed by attendance, 
real expenditures, and then real assets. The ordering for the black 
sample would be similar except for the fact that real assets and real 
expenditures would be switched in position. 
E. Conclusions 
This chapter sought to empirically test the theoretical models 
addressing consumers' investment in education as laid out in the 
literature. The vector autoregressive approach proved to be very 
beneficial in that it allowed the data to tell the researcher the types of 
relationships that existed among the variables of interest without 
assuming any type of relationship among these variables a priori. 
Although this type of approach had not been previously used to investigate 
the educational investment process, it was an approach found to be quite 
useful. 
It was anticipated at the onset that many of the theoretical models 
would each have some relevance when it came to causal relationships among 
the variables. This was found to be true. The empirical findings showed 
that each model had some relevance and that none could be eliminated from 
the list of models that tell the story of educational investment. 
Further, the empirical findings demonstrated that no one model better 
described the educational investment process better than any other. 
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The most intriguing finding from this chapter's empirical 
investigation was the fact that a shock in public school attendance caused 
property values to rise. It has long been a paradox as to why, in an era 
of segregation, whites had any incentive to invest in black school 
systems. The answer to this paradox may lie in the results of this 
chapter's empirical work. If local governments, which were almost 
exclusively controlled by whites during the time period this study covers, 
could see some economic benefit from investing in blacks schools, it seems 
logical that they would not totally discriminate against black with regard 
to education and see to it that some of the county tax money went to black 
schools as well as white schools. Increased property values resulting 
from a better-educated labor force could be the economic incentive which 
existed. This paradox is more fully addressed in a theoretical setting in 
chapter V. Before moving to a theoretical presentation concerning this 
paradox, the private school choice is investigated in the next chapter. 
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IV. CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS! THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE 
A. Introduction 
Whenever the investment in public education is discussed, the picture 
can only be completed by discussing the investment in private education. 
The reason for this being that investment in private schools is a 
substitute for investment in public schools. This chapter will 
investigate the causal relationships among variables relevant to both the 
public and private school choice. In particular, one goal of this chapter 
is to empirically determine whether investment in private schools in an 
era of segregation had the same effect on property values that investment 
in public schools had. 
Before looking at the empirical investigation of the private-public 
school choice, it is important to look at relevant literature on 
investment in private schools and how such investment affects the public 
school systems. The literature review is covered in the following 
section. Following the literature review are sections discussing the 
predicted causal relationships, the empirical procedure, and the findings 
from the empirical investigation. 
As was the goal in chapter III, the goal here is to let the data 
speak for themselves with no a priori assumption as to model type. The 
literature has suggested various causal relationships among relevant 
variables. This investigation will test whether or not these 
relationships hold true. To capture any feedback effects or reverse 
causality which may exist among variables, the empirical analysis will 
employ a simple vector autoregressive (VAR) model. This is the exact 
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approach used in the previous chapter about the public school choice. 
Such a model allows for the generation of impulse responses which give a 
feel for the dynamic response of variables to changes or "shocks" in the 
system. 
B. Literature Review 
Long and Toma [1988] investigated the public-private school choice. 
They found that household income, homeownership, educational background of 
the parents, the race of the parents, the level of expenditures per 
student in public schools, the relative number of private schools, the 
cost of private education, and the percentage of the population that was 
Catholic influenced households' decisions to send their children to 
private schools. As a dependent variable they used school choice. They 
measured school choice as a 0, 1, or 2 according to whether the child 
attended a public school, a parochial school, or a nonparochial private 
school. 
They found that the coefficient on income was positive. This finding 
backed the a priori assumption that as income rises, parents would be more 
likely to consider private schools as an alternative to public education. 
The coefficient on the white (race) was also positive as expected. They 
found that the probability of white households sending their elementary 
school age children to private schools was 6.3% higher than nonwhites. 
Age and educational background of the parents were also found to 
positively influence the private school choice, as did home ownership. As 
was expected, public school expenditures and the cost of private education 
had a negative impact on the private school choice. However, Long and 
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Toma could not prove these to be statistically significant. The relative 
number of private schools and the percentage of Catholics in the 
population were both found to be highly significant with positive 
coefficients. 
Long and Toma also investigated the income elasticities of private 
schooling. Their findings indicated that the income elasticities were 
larger among nonwhites than whites. 
Martinez-Vasguez and Seaman [1985] looked at the Tiebout hypothesis 
and private school choice. They considered three options that households 
have. "In an area with several school districts, the options available to 
the household include remaining within the present school district and 
attending public schools, remaining in the present school district and 
attending private schools, and moving to another school district and 
attending public school." [Martinez-Vasguez and Seaman, 1985, p. 296] 
They developed a decision rule for some taxpayer, i. "If the 
marginal valuation of education summed over the additional education that 
i can consume privately compared to what was available publicly (a measure 
of frustration with publicly supplied education) exceeds the expenditure 
(net of moving coats) on the amount of private education for all public 
school districts j, then i will choice private schooling." [Martinez-
Vasguez and Seaman, 1985, p. 297] 
This decision rule then provided them with determinants of the 
private school choice. They considered income, private school costs, 
religious beliefs, racial content of a community, educational background 
of the parents, and expenditures in the public schools (quality). 
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To test their expectations, they used cross-sectional data from 75 
large areas across the country. Because they predicted some simultaneity 
between expenditures per student and enrollment figures they used OLS and 
two-stage least squares as regression techniques. When considering 
private schools, they like many others, separated parochial schools 
enrollments from nonparochial private schools enrollments. 
In both the parochial and nonparochial private school equations, the 
percentage of Catholics in the population was found to be positive and 
significant. Also positive and significant in both equations was the 
percentage of nonwhites in the community. Catholic school tuition had the 
anticipated negative sign for Catholic school enrollment, but had a 
positive sign in the nonparochial private school equation. Such opposite 
signs in the two equations would be expected if the two are thought to be 
gross substitutes for one another. 
Also of interest were public school expenditures per pupil. In both 
equations expenditures were found to have negative coefficients, implying 
that expenditures are a measure of quality and increasing quality of 
public schools would shift enrollments from private to public schools. 
However, the coefficients in both equations were not statistically 
significant. 
Akin and Lea [1982] included the percentage of children in private 
schools in their regression estimating educational expenditures per pupil 
in a given region. They also included property value, the cost of 
providing education, income level, the number of school aged children in a 
household, the education of the parents, the percentage of the population 
who are minority, and the age of the parents. Their empirical results 
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demonstrated a significant negative relationship between the percentage of 
children in private schools and the educational expenditures per pupil in 
the public schools. 
Using cross-sectional data from all states, West and Palsson [1988] 
tested a model for the probability of attending a private school relative 
to a public school. As explanatory variables they used the proportion of 
Catholics in the population, the pupil/teacher ratio, the proportion of 
whites in the population, the income level, the cost of private schools, 
and a few others. It was found that parents tended to place their 
children into private schools when public school class sizes were quite 
large. "Significant and positive independent variables turned out to be 
the Catholic proportion of the population, the pupil/teacher ratio, the 
number and length of strikes, and per capita income. Significant and 
negative independent variables included the proportion of administrative 
expense to total expenditure, the proportion in all school districts who 
are NBA members, and the average tuition..." [West and Palsson, 1988, p. 
737] 
West and Palsson also measured price elasticities for private 
education. To do so they used opinion surveys in an attempt to estimate 
people's reactions to hypothetical subsidization of private schools by the 
government. Their surveys showed very elastic responses to the 
hypothetical subsidization scheme suggested. 
The assumption that private school enrollment depends on the public 
school racial composition is the basis for Clotfelter's [1976] analysis of 
the private-public school decision. For explanatory variables in his 
model, Clotfelter used the proportion of whites who were Catholic (a taste 
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component), white median income, and the average number of children per 
white family. Also included were variables for desegregation policy. 
Cross-sectional data (U.S. metropolitan areas) from 1960 and 1970 
were used. The analysis found the percent Catholic to be positively 
related to private school enrollments. Family size was negatively related 
as expected, but insignificant. Racial composition (percent nonwhites) 
was found to have a significant impact on private enrollments. From the 
results Clotfelter concluded that in the case of desegregation, there was 
"white flight." The increase in the proportion of nonwhites in public 
schools caused white parents to enroll their children in private schools. 
"White flight" was found not to be significant in areas where public 
schools were predominately white. 
Education reaction functions were the analysis approach taken by 
Erekson [1982] when he investigated consumer responses to state aid 
programs. His claim was that very little attention is ever given to what 
happens to per pupil expenditures when state aid programs are designed. 
He felt that those who did not benefit from such programs would either 
move to another school district or enroll their children in private 
schools. These two choices he termed "exit choices." The purpose of his 
paper was to investigate what happens to per pupil expenditures in the 
public school system when parents switch their children to or from the 
private schools. 
Prior to empirical investigation, Erekson decided that private school 
enrollment would have an ambiguous effect on per pupil expenditures in the 
public schools due to counteracting effects. The two counteracting 
effects are termed the scaling effect and the support effect. The scaling 
effect would be a situation in which the public school expenditures 
increased when private school enrollments increased, holding revenues 
constant. The support effect would be a situation in which increased 
private school enrollment leads to a decrease in support for the public 
schools, which in turn leads to decreased revenues and decreased per pupil 
expenditures. He expected that the support effect would dominate the 
scaling effect. He further expected that if public school expenditures 
per pupil were increased, private school enrollments would decrease. In 
other words, he believed that some reverse causality existed. 
The empirical work that Erekson did involved data from New York 
school districts from 1970 to 1971. He employed these data in his two-
equation reaction curve model. The dependent variable in the first 
equation was public school expenditures per pupil. Included as exogenous 
variables were family income, the percentage of persons holding white 
collar jobs (a taste for education variable), tax price, a migration 
variable, and the proportion of students enrolled in private schools. 
The second equation modeled enrollment in private schools. Both 
parochial and nonparochial private schools were studied. Tuition was used 
as an exogenous variable as well as expenditures per pupil in the private 
schools (a measure of quality), household income, the percentage of 
persons below the poverty level (a taste for private education variable), 
migration, and the proportion of students enrolled in public schools. 
To estimate his model, Erekson used two-stage least squares. This 
method was employed to avoid simultaneous equations bias. The empirical 
work showed coefficients with anticipated signs. Income had a positive 
coefficient in the public school enrollment equation, but negative in the 
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private school equation. Although increases in income would be conducive 
to better affording private education, it might also increase expenditures 
per pupil in the public schools, which in turn might cause private 
enrollments to decrease. This was the explanation for the negative 
coefficient on income in the private school enrollment equation. 
Tax price had a negative effect on public school enrollments as 
expected. Also exerting a negative influence on public school enrollments 
was migration. The percentage of persons who were white collar workers 
did demonstrate a strong preference for education. 
The price of tuition was expected to have a negative impact on 
private school enrollments. The impact was negative for nonparochial 
private schools, but positive for parochial schools. Erekson explained 
this unexpected result for parochial schools as being due to parochial 
school tuition serving as an indicator of school quality because it is 
thought that parochial school enrollment is very price inelastic. 
Migration also had differing signs on its coefficients for parochial 
and nonparochial private school enrollments. Migration had the 
anticipated negative sign for parochial schools. However, it was found to 
significantly increase enrollments in nonparochial private schools. Out 
migration would typically cause a decrease in public school demand. 
Erekson's explanation for the positive coefficient was that nonparochial 
private school enrollment could serve as an alternative to migration for 
those persons dissatisfied with the public schools. 
Also significant in the empirical work was the fact that increases in 
nonparochial private school enrollments caused increases in public school 
per pupil expenditures. This fact implies that the scaling effect 
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dominated in Erekson's model. This was just the opposite of what he had 
expected. Increases in public school expenditures did not significantly 
affect parochial school enrollments, but did significantly increase 
nonparochial school enrollments. 
Increases in the nonwhite population were found to significantly 
increase parochial school enrollments, but not nonparochial private school 
enrollments. Urbanization was also found to increase parochial school 
enrollments, but not nonparochial school enrollments. The percentage of 
the population below the poverty level exhibited negative coefficients for 
parochial and nonparochial school enrollments. 
Elasticities were also calculated between various variables in the 
model. Among the interesting results was the fact that public school 
expenditures and enrollments in parochial schools had zero elasticity 
values. The elasticity values between nonparochial private school 
enrollments and public school expenditures were positive. 
C. Conclusions from the Literature 
The primary variables in the literature used to study the investment 
in private schools are pretty consistent across studies. These variables 
are household income, race (or percentage in the population), expenditures 
per student in the public schools, the number of private schools, the cost 
of private schools, and the percentage of Catholics in the population. 
From the literature and from economic theory one would predict that if a 
regression were run with private school enrollments as the dependent 
variable, the coefficients on household income, the number of private 
schools, the percentage of nonwhites in a community, and the percentage of 
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Catholics in a community would be positive. The cost of private education 
and the expenditures per student in public schools would be predicted to 
have negative coefficients. 
D. The Data 
1. General description 
The data set used for this particular investigation was similar to 
the Maryland school district data set utilized for the public school 
choice investigation in the last chapter. To maintain consistency with 
the previous investigation, elementary school data were chosen. The 
cross-sectional time series in this case consisted of 28 years of data 
(1928 to 1955) for 23 white school systems and 22 black school systems. 
Private school data for the state of Maryland were not reported prior to 
1928, so maintaining the 32-year length of the time series was not 
possible for this analysis. 
The variables used in the empirical analysis were variables which 
were used in the public school empirical analysis REXPPA, ATTPTH, ASSETPTH 
(real expenditures per pupil attending (public schools), average daily 
attendance per thousand in the population (county), total assessment 
taxable at full rate (in real terms) per thousand in the population 
(county)), but further include the numbers of pupils enrolled in Maryland 
nonpublic elementary schools (all private schools) per thousand in the 
population (county), TPRIVPTH. (See chapter III, section C for a further 
description of REXPPA, ATTPTH, and ASSETPTH.) The data on private school 
enrollments were taken from the Annual Reports of the State of Maryland 
Board of Education. Since the birth rate per thousand in the population 
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(county) had relatively inelastic dynamic elasticity values and was 
extremely exogenous, this variable was not considered in this analysis. 
Sample means and standard deviations are shown in Table 4.1. 
2. Stationaritv 
To ensure stationarity, a correction for trend and a correction for 
county-specific means were incorporated. To make these corrections, OLS 
regressions were run for each of the variables with a constant, year 
(trend), and county dummies (22 for white samples and 21 for black 
samples) serving as the explanatory variables. The residuals from these 
regressions were then saved for use in the vector autoregressions. These 
new variables were named REXD, ATTD, ASSD, and TPRD. Unlike the previous 
analysis, the existence of zeroes in the data made it impossible to use 
the natural logarithms. Although it would have made the interpretation of 
the empirical results much nicer, the natural logarithm transformation was 
not a necessity to meet the stationarity conditions of constant mean and 
constant variance. 
3. The causal model and lag lengths 
The model of causality used for this analysis was identical to that 
used in chapter III (section B) with the exception of the birth rate 
variable (RPTD) being replaced by the enrollment in private schools 
variable (TPRD). For the same reasons as in the previous analysis, a lag 
length of 7 was maintained for this analysis. 
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Table 4.1. Sample statistics 
Variable Mean standard deviation 
White sample: 
REXPPA 
ATTPTH 
TPRIVPTH 
ASSETPTH 
116.55 
111.36 
13.82 
1484.37 
33.16 
2 2 . 8 8  
20.70 
475.92 
Black sample: 
REXPPA 
ATTPTH 
TPRIVPTH 
ASSETPTH 
88.51 
138.11 
4.47 
1491.69 
42.79 
22.55 
12.69 
482.72 
Combined sample: 
REXPPA 
ATTPTH 
TPRIVPTH 
ASSETPTH 
102.84 
124.44 
9.25 
1487.69 
40.65 
26.36 
17.87 
479.08 
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E. Empirical Results 
1. Regression procedure 
The procedure followed for the empirical analysis was identical to 
that of the previous investigation. A full description of this procedure 
can be found in chapter III, section D. The model was run three times: 
once for the white sample, once for the black sample, and once for the 
combined sample. All regressions results are reported accordingly. 
2. Direction of causalitv 
To determine the interrelationships among the variables, F-tests were 
used. These results are reported in Table 4.2. From these F-tests it can 
be concluded that causality runs in both directions, or that a feedback 
effect is present among the real expenditures, attendance, and real assets 
variables. These variables also showed similar causality in the public 
school VAR (Table 3.3). Real expenditures, attendance, and real assets 
had insignificant P-statistics when used in the equation with private 
school enrollment as the dependent variable. The one exception to this 
was the impact of public school attendance on private school enrollment in 
the combined sample. Although not significant at the .05 level, public 
school attendance could also be considered to cause enrollments in private 
schools in the black sample at a .10 significance level. Private school 
enrollments demonstrated a significant impact in determining real 
expenditures per pupil in the public schools in white and in the combined 
samples. Private school enrollments were further found to be significant 
in causing real assets in the white sample. 
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Table 4.2. F-Statistics for white, black, and combined samples^ 
Dependent variable 
Independent 
variable REXO ATTD TPRD ASSD 
White sample: 
HEXD 
ATTD 
TPRD 
44.85 
(.4034E-07) 
13.00 
(.4034E-07) 
4.21 
<.1640E-03) 
6.59 
(.2370E-06) 
182.43 
(.4034E-07) 
1.54 
(.1524) 
1.50 
(.1639) 
1.23 
( . 2 8 6 2 )  
493.16 
( .4034E-07) 
7.58 
(.5193E-07) 
15.94 
(.4034E-07) 
2.85 
(.6477E-02) 
ASSD 8.33 
(.4171E-07) 
5.00 
( .1786E-04) 
1.12 
(.3513) 
90.35 
(.4034E-07) 
Black sample: 
REXD 46.37 
(.lllOE-15) 
3.01 
(.4273E-02) 
0.93 
(.4813) 
11.39 
(.2705E-12) 
ATTD 3.07 
(.3596E-02) 
162.08 
(.lllOE-15) 
1.76 
(.9296E-01) 
8.02  
(.3544E-08) 
TPRD 0.91 
(.4954) 
1.71 
(.1052) 
415.36 
(.2220E-15) 
0.38 
(.9116) 
ASSD 3.08 
(.3521E-02) 
2.27 
(.2830E-01) 
0.48 
( .8507) 
96.68 
(.4441E-15) 
Combined sample: 
REXD 
ATTD 
TPRD 
ASSD 
84.53 
(.4034E-07) 
8.32 
(.4105E-07) 
3.26 
(.1987E-02) 
9.32 
(.4037E-07) 
7.13 
(.4105E-07) 
374.25 
(.4034E-07) 
1.49 
( .1686)  
4.59 
(.4656E-04) 
1.57 
(.1419) 
2 . 0 2  
(.4980E-01) 
880.41 
(.4034E-07) 
0.62 
(.7438) 
18.03 
(.4034E-07) 
21.90 
(.4034E-07) 
1.58 
(.1388) 
183.34 
(.4034E-07) 
^Significance level in parentheses. The critical value of F(7,n) at 
the .05 significance level where n = 455, 434, 917 respectively for the 
white, black, and combined samples, would lie somewhere between 2.09 
(F(7,120)) and 2.01 (F(7,oo)). 
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3. Impulse responaea and sign of causality 
With the direction of causality determined among the relevant 
variables through the use of F-teats, the sign of causality was 
determined. To accomplish this, impulse response functions were generated 
to simulate the system's dynamic response to shocks in each of the 
variables. (Refer to chapter III, section D, part 3 for a full 
description of the procedure.) The impulse responses of a given variable 
were summed over time (time periods 1 through 5 and time periods 1 through 
14). Such a summation gives the overall impact (both sign and magnitude) 
of a shock. The summations of the impulse responses are reported in Table 
4.3. On closer inspection, one will note that the magnitude of the values 
reported in Table 4.3 is much different from the magnitude of the values 
found in Table 3.4. This is due to the fact that these second set of 
impulse responses are not in natural logarithm form as was the case with 
those reported in the previous table. 
4. Elasticities of responses 
To be able' to compare and contrast the results from this chapter with 
the results from chapter III, it was again appropriate to calculate 
dynamic elasticities for each of the variables. Dynamic elasticities are 
useful in interpreting results because they are unitless and because they 
indicate how responsive any of the variables are to a shock in any one of 
the variables. 
The calculation of the dynamic elasticity values was done somewhat 
differently in this analysis than was done in the previous analysis. (See 
chapter III, part D, section 5.) In the previous analysis the calculation 
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Table 4.3. Summation of the impulse responses, T = 14, for white, black, 
and combined samples® 
Sum of the impulses 
Shock 
variable REXD ATTO TPRO ASSD 
White sample; 
REXD 20.4765 2.5737 -5.8202 275.8226 
(21.3820) (-0.8586) (-1.4145) (54.8108) 
ATTD -12.9508 3.0542 -2.4443 66.9827 
(1.0213) (16.8741) (0.1985) (162.0880) 
TPRD 0.2145 -0.1781 13.9818 242.8024 
(4.1784) (1.8925) (8.4644) (92.4858) 
ASSD -12.3615 -12.1521 -0.4361 194.8234 
(-8.5189) (-2.6049) (-0.1818) (209.9264) 
Black sample: 
REXD 14.5257 9.0635 -0.4306 448.8671 
(27.0247) (1.4527) (0.2424) (126.3242) 
ATTD 2.9889 40.5097 -3.3980 351.0626 
(4.9609) (27.7345) (-0.4177) (142.3055) 
TPRD 13.2930 1.3398 12.4266 -1.4731 
(1.0786) (-3.5240) (7.8752) (-7.5309) 
ASSD -20.8412 -7.9019 0.9805 301.8054 
(-4.6335) (-1.5182) (0.0150) (280.2458) 
Combined sample: 
REXD 17.8063 
(25.4237) 
2.7524 
(0.8025) 
-4.2978 
(-0.8029) 
350.4249 
(100.8657) 
ATTD -5.8344 
(2.8526) 
24.4410 
(24.2372) 
-2.7550 
(0.2571) 
250.6979 
(167.0170) 
TPRD 2.2678 
(2.6696) 
-2.1017 
(-1.0095) 
15.4906 
(8.6143) 
119.2509 
(45.3201) 
ASSD -17.7620 
(-7.1486) 
-12.0500 
(-2.2591) 
0.0342 
(-0.1036) 
224.7265 
(247.5866) 
= 5 in parentheses. 
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of the dynamic elasticity values was made easy by the fact that the 
impulse responses were reported in natural logarithm form. That was not 
the case in this analysis. To get a percent change in the response 
variable relative to a percent change in the shock variable, equation 4.1 
was used. 
% A y (E Yt / y) 
T = —2 (4.1) 
% A X (Xj / X) 
The numerator for the dynamic elasticity measure would be calculated 
by summing the impulse responses of the variable responding to the initial 
shock over the appropriate time period (T = 5 or T = 14) and dividing this 
sum by the mean of that variable. The denominator would be the value of 
the shock, which is the initial value of the impulse response function for 
the variable relative to its mean. 
Using this formula, dynamic elasticities were calculated for shocks 
in all of the variables and the resulting responsiveness in each of the 
variables. These results are reported in Table 4.4. The values of the 
shocks in each of the variables (in percentage terms) are shown in 
parentheses beside the shock variables in the table. It is interesting to 
note that the values of the shocks which were calculated in this analysis 
are consistent with those found in Table 3.5. The fact that the values 
are so close demonstrates that equation 4.1 is an appropriate method of 
calculating dynamic elasticities when the data are not in natural 
logarithm form. 
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Table 4.4. Dynamic elasticities due to typical random shocks for white, 
black, and combined samples, T = 14^ 
Dynamic elasticities 
Shock variable 
(value) REXD ATTD TPRD ASSD 
White samples 
REXD (.077) 
ATTD (.038) 
TPRD (.116) 
ASSD (.061) 
Black sample; 
REXD (.106) 
ATTD (.046) 
TPRD (.329) 
ASSD (.069) 
Combined sample: 
REXD (.095) 
ATTD (.044) 
TPRD (.179) 
ASSD (.066) 
2.29 
(2.39) 
-2.95 
(0.23) 
0 .16  
(0.31) 
-1.73 
(1.19) 
1.54 
(2.87) 
0.74 
(1.23) 
0.46% 
(0.04) 
-3.40 
(-0.76) 
1 .82  
(2.61) 
-1.28 
(0.63) 
0.12 
(0.14) 
-2.59 
(-1.04) 
0.30 
( - 0 . 1 0 )  
0.73 
(4.02) 
-O.Olb 
(0.15) 
-1.78 
(-0.38) 
0 . 6 2  
(0 .01 )  
6.41 
(4.39) 
0.03b 
( - 0 . 0 8 )  
-0.83 
( - 0 . 1 6 )  
0.23 
(0.07) 
4.44 
(4.40) 
-0.09b 
(-0.05) 
-1.45 
(-0.27) 
-5.49° 
(-1.33) 
-4.69b 
(0.38) 
8.75 
(5.29) 
-O.Slb 
(-0.21) 
-0.90° 
(0.51) 
-16 .60  
(-2.04) 
8.44 
(5.35) 
3.16b 
(0.05) 
-4.90° 
(-0.91) 
-6.73 
(0.63) 
9.33 
(5.19) 
0.06b 
(-0.17) 
2.42 
(0.48) 
1.20 
(2.90) 
1.41 
(0.54) 
2.14 
(2.30) 
2.83 
( 0 . 8 0 )  
5.15 
(2.09) 
O.Gob 
( - 0 . 0 2 )  
2.92 
(2.71) 
2.48 
(0.71) 
3.81 
(2.54) 
0.45b 
(0.17) 
2 . 2 6  
(2.49) 
®T=5 in parentheses. 
bwot jointly significantly different from zero at the .05 level of 
significance in Table 4.2. 
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5. Empirical findings vs. theoretical predictions 
The dynamic elasticity results are reported for both T=5 and T=14. 
The discussion that follows refers to the T=14 elasticity values, unless 
otherwise noted. 
Both real expenditures and real assets had a positive elastic 
response to a shock in real expenditures in all three samples. This 
result was consistent with the findings in the previous analysis. Tiebout 
theory or human capital investment theory would predict that public school 
attendance would rise due to an increase in real expenditures per pupil. 
In the previous analysis, this was not found to be true. However, in this 
analysis the dynamic elasticity measure for public school attendance 
showed a positive sign for all samples, but was inelastic in all cases. 
The total private school enrollment variable showed a very elastic 
negative response to an increase in real expenditures in both the white 
and the combined samples (-5.49 and -4.90 respectively). An increase in 
real expenditures was found to have a negative impact on black total 
private school enrollments as well. The value was inelastic (-0.90), 
however. These results demonstrate that real expenditures per pupil were 
viewed by parents as a measure of school quality in the public school 
system. If the school quality were increased, then parents would tend not 
to send their children to private schools. 
A shock in public school attendance caused responses in real 
expenditures and real assets similar to those in the first analysis. In 
the combined sample, the previous dynamic elasticity value for real 
expenditures was negative and very inelastic (-0.07). For this analysis 
the result was negative, but elastic (-1.28). As predicted, increased 
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public school attendance caused a positive elastic response in real assets 
in all three samples. 
An increase in total private school enrollments had very little 
impact on real expenditures and public school attendance. The elasticity 
measures for real expenditures were all positive, but inelastic (0.16, 
0.46, and 0.12 respectively). The impact on public school attendance was 
negative in both the white and the combined samples and positive in the 
black sample. All of these measures were very inelastic, however. As one 
would predict, an increase in private school enrollments had an impact on 
real assets similar to that of an increase in public school attendance. 
The white sample demonstrated this best. The dynamic elasticity measure 
for real assets was positive and elastic (1.41). Given how few private 
black school existed, it was not surprising to see the 0.00 elasticity 
measure for real assets in the black sample. While the value was positive 
in the combined sample, it was inelastic (0.45). 
The real expenditure dynamic elasticity measures resulting from a 
shock in real assets were almost identical to those in the previous 
analysis. The impact of a real asset shock on attendance were very 
similar to those of the previous analysis as well. Total private school 
enrollments showed a negative inelastic response to a shock in real assets 
in the white sample (-0.51), but a positive elastic response in the black 
sample (3.16). For the combined sample, the elasticity measure was 
positive, but very inelastic (0.06). The positive responses would be 
consistent with theory in that greater wealth would tend to causes private 
school enrollments to rise. 
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The results found In this analysis, as in the previous analysis, 
support the idea that increased expenditures or increased attendance (in 
either public schools or in private schools) do appear to cause real 
assets in the community to rise. As was stated in the previous chapter, 
there could be many possible reasons for property values or real assets 
increasing due to a better-educated community. The best explanation thus 
far is that better quality education or more education cause the future 
labor force to be better educated and therefore enhance the value of 
capital in that community. The results of this analysis further 
demonstrate that there was incentive to invest in the education of both 
black and whites in an era of segregation. 
6. Decomposition of variance 
To complete the empirical investigation and to keep it consistent 
with the empirical work performed in chapter III, decomposition of 
variance was performed. Variance decomposition gives the percent of the 
variance of a particular variable due to own innovations and innovations 
in other variables. The method of calculation is explained in chapter 
III, section D, part 6 (equation 3.17). The variance decomposition for 
each variable over 5 years and over 14 years is reported in Table 4.5. 
The results are reported using the impulse responses with ordering real 
expenditures, public school attendance, total private school enrollment, 
and real assets. 
After five years, public school attendance and private school 
attendance seem to be influenced very little by other variables. The 
percent of variation in these variables was explained by between 94 and 99 
80 
Table 4.5. Variance decomposition after 14 years for white, black, and 
combined samples® 
Variable REXD 
Percentage due to 
ATTD TPRD ASSD 
White sample: 
REXD 62.50 
(79.13) 
21.99 
(4.64) 
4.32 
(4.35) 
11.20  
(11 .88 )  
ATTD 7.43 
(0.73) 
75.44 
(94.08) 
4.82 
(1.54) 
12.30 
(3.64) 
TPRD 10.53 
(3.20) 
4.42 
(0.14) 
84.87 
(96.54) 
0.17 
(0.12) 
ASSD 21.69 
(3.62) 
29.91 
(27.50) 
13.48 
(8.98) 
34.92 
(59.90) 
Black sample: 
REXD 76.84 
(92.34) 
6.14 
(3.68) 
5.88 
(0.37) 
11.14 
(3.60) 
ATTD 7.78 
(0.73) 
86.12 
(96.31) 
3.44 
(2.05) 
2.67 
(0.91) 
TPRD 0.79 
( 0 . 2 0 )  
5.32 
(0.87) 
93.26 
(98.89) 
0.63 
(0.04) 
ASSD 39.28 
(12.03) 
20.86 
(16.25) 
1.66 
(0.24) 
38.20 
(71.48) 
Combined sample: 
REXD 77.59 
(88.58) 
9.34 
(2.19) 
1.18 
(1.54) 
11.89 
(7.69) 
ATTD 6.79 
(0.42) 
85.07 
(97.59) 
0.71 
(0.22) 
7.42 
(1.77) 
TPRD 5.93 
(0.98) 
4.98 
(0.33) 
88.97 
(98.67) 
0 .12  
( 0 . 0 2 )  
ASSD 31.58 
( 8 . 2 6 )  
25.20 
(23.99) 
2.73 
(1 .80)  
40.49 
(65.96) 
^After 5 years in parentheses. 
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percent of their own innovations. Real expenditures in the black sample 
also showed very little variation being explained by other variables after 
five years. The white sample showed 20.87 percent of the variation in 
real expenditures coming from innovations other than own innovations after 
five years. The most interesting result when considering variance 
decomposition after five years is that of real assets. Public school 
attendance and total private school enrollment were able to explain 36.48 
percent of the variation in real assets in the white sample after only 
five years. In the black sample and combined sample, these variables were 
able to explain 16.49 and 25.79 percent respectively of real assets 
variation. 
After 14 years, real expenditures and real assets were found to 
explain 19.73 percent of the variation in public school attendance in the 
white sample. Although real assets did not explain much variation in 
public school attendance in the black sample, real expenditures were found 
to explain 7.78 percent after 14 years. Variation in real expenditures 
was influenced by the other three variables such that 62.50 percent, 76.84 
percent, and 77.59 percent was due to own innovations in the white, black, 
and combined samples respectively. Variation in total private school 
enrollments was due mostly to own innovations, but 10.53 percent was 
attributable to real expenditures in the white sample. In the black 
sample, variation in total private school enrollments was again due mostly 
to own innovations, but 5.32 percent was attributable to public school 
attendance. Real assets were most highly influenced by the other 
variables. Only 34.92, 38.20, and 40.49 percent of variation in real 
assets was due to own innovations in the white, black, and combined 
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samples respectively. Real expenditures explained the greatest percent of 
the variation in real assets in both the black and the combined samples 
(39.28 and 31.58 respectively). In the white sample, public school 
attendance (29.91 percent) explained even more than real expenditures 
(21.69 percent). 
From the variance decomposition it is possible to rank the variables 
from most exogenous (least influenced by the other variables) to the most 
endogenous (most influenced by the other variables). In this analysis, 
total private school enrollment was the most exogenous for all three 
samples. One would expect real expenditures in the public school system 
to influence private school enrollments, but one would further expect 
other variables not considered in this analysis to have a significant 
effect as well. Variables which would tend to influence private school 
enrollments are the ones addressed by the literature. These would be the 
percent Catholic in the population (a religious preference or taste 
variable), the number of private schools available, the cost of private 
schooling (a price variable), and the percent white or black in the 
population (a taste for discrimination variable). With these variables 
absent from this analysis, it is not surprising that total private school 
enrollments is quite exogenous in nature. These, variables are left for 
the more traditional empirical analysis of chapter VI. 
of the remaining variables considered here, attendance in the public 
schools was the next most exogenous variable in all three samples followed 
by real expenditures. The least exogenous or, in other words, the most 
endogenous variable in all of the samples was real assets. 
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F. Conclusions 
As was true with the public school choice investigation, using a 
vector autoregressive methodology to investigate causal relationships 
among variables affecting both private and public school investment 
provided some interesting empirical results. One goal of this chapter was 
to test whether private school enrollment had the same effect on property 
values that public school attendance did. For the white sample, it did. 
This was not true for the black sample, however. Private school 
enrollment by blacks had no effect on property values at all. This was 
probably attributable to the fact that the percent of black children 
attending private schools in any given county was quite negligible. It 
was interesting to note that most of the variables showed very inelastic 
responses to changes in private school enrollments. The causal 
relationships among the other three variables (REXD, ATTD, and ASSD) did 
not change significantly from the previous investigation. 
Before a more traditional approach empirical approach is applied to 
the public-private school choice in chapter VI, a theoretical approach is 
taken to investigate the interaction between investment in education and 
property values. A theoretical model will be derived in the next chapter 
that will encompass the empirical findings of chapters III and IV as well 
as characteristics from various models found in the literature. 
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v. educational investmentt a look at hyroal's paradox 
A. An Introduction 
Thus far in this study educational investment has been addressed 
primarily without regard to race. An interesting extension of the 
discussion in chapters III and IV is to specifically examine the 
interaction between educational investment and property values in the 
segregated era. In particular, this interaction may provide leverage 
toward explaining why there was an incentive for white-dominated school 
systems to invest in education for white and black children alike. 
This paradox was first addressed by Myrdal [1944]. Various 
explanations have been put forth in attempts to solve this paradox. 
However, the explanation to be concentrated upon in this section is one 
given by Richard Freeman [1973]. Freeman suggested that whites may have 
been willing to invest in black schools with the hopes of reaping the 
benefits of a better-educated labor force. His explanation backs the 
empirical findings of chapter III and chapter IV. The empirical analysis 
of these chapters showed that positive shocks in educational investment, 
in the form of either educational expenditures or attendance, would cause 
property values to rise. This chapter will investigate the theoretical 
underpinnings of this empirical finding. 
The first goal of this chapter is to review the literature and 
summarize what has been studied to date with regard to educational 
investment, provision of educational services, segregated schools, and the 
relationship educational investment might have to property values. This 
chapter will take the literature one step further and develop a 
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theoretical model which backs the idea that there is a positive 
relationship between property values and educational investment. This 
model is a two-period model which includes a representative profit-
maximizing firm and a representative utility-maximizing household. 
B. Literature Review 
The literature on educational investment is quite limited when it 
comes to the investigation of segregated schools and the racial 
differences which existed in the educational services provided. Margo has 
concentrated much effort in this area of study. Kousser, Pritchett, 
Freeman, and Fishback have also addressed this area. Their work will be 
discussed in this chapter. Orazem, Edwards, and Cebula have made 
contributions as well. Their contributions have already been discussed in 
chapter II. 
Margo [1990] took a human capital approach when he modeled school 
attendance of southern children in 1900. For explanatory variables, he 
used household characteristics such as literacy of parents, home 
ownership, and occupational status. Other independent variables included 
the child's age, age squared, the gender of the child, the number of 
children under 5, school density, length of the school year, the teacher-
pupil ratio, and average teacher salary (quality variable). 
Tobit models were used to run the regressions of school attendance 
for both blacks and whites because the dependent variable was often zero. 
Home ownership and occupational status had the anticipated positive signs 
for both samples. Literacy also had a positive effect on attendance for 
both black and white children. The child's age exhibited a positive but 
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decreasing effect on attendance. The nonlinearity in age is attributed to 
the fact that most children left school by the age of 15 or 16. Gender 
had no significant effect on attendance. If there were children under 5 
at home, attendance of older children was significantly decreased in black 
families. 
The school characteristics attempt to capture both quantity and 
quality measures. School density and length of school term are both 
measures of quantity. It would be anticipated that as the number of 
schools in an area increased, attendance would rise. A positive response 
in attendance would also be expëcted if the length of the school term were 
increased. However, school density did not affect attendance for either 
blacks or whites. Longer school terms encouraged greater attendance, the 
effect being much more significant for blacks than whites. 
The teacher-student ratio and average salary of teachers were used as 
proxies for the quality of education. Both variables had the anticipated 
positive effect on attendance for both blacks and whites. The teacher-
student ratio was significant for both races. The average salary was 
marginally significant for black attendance and insignificant for whites. 
Margo concluded that: 
Racial differences in school characteristics account 
for 40-77 percent of the racial attendance gap, 
depending on how the effect of separate-but-equal is 
calculated. Had the equal part of separate-but-equal 
been enforced, the racial attendance gap would have 
been much smaller. But even if it had been enforced, 
black children still would have attended less 
frequently than white children, because of racial 
differences in family background. Inadequate 
educational opportunities were not the sole, or even 
quantitatively the most important reason for the 
racial attendance gap. Racial differences in adult 
literacy, occupational status, and homeownership 
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account for 74-83 percent of the racial attendance 
gap/ adult literacy, by itself, explains over.half of 
the gap. [Margo, 1990, pp. 78-79] 
Margo also investigated why there was any incentive, in an era of 
segregation, for whites to invest in black schools. Margo has found that 
the quality of black schools improved in most states from the early 1900's 
through the 1950's. [Margo, 1988, p. 2] 
Margo developed a model of local government discrimination/mobility. 
[Margo, 1988] He showed that local public goods are always provided and 
that the amount supplied to nonwhites is less than the desired level in 
that their taxes exceed the expenditures on local public goods. This 
degree of discrimination decreases as nonwhites become more mobile and 
their labor services are desired by other locations. 
From his local government discrimination model Margo concluded that, 
with no collusion of local governments and geographic mobility of 
nonwhites, local public goods will be provided to nonwhites. He also 
concluded that since perfect mobility is implausible, there must be other 
factors affecting the decision to provide local public goods and services, 
one of these being the economic benefits of having black workers who are 
better-educated. 
To look at these issues further, Margo examined black mobility and 
the quality of schooling. [Margo, 1988] The model he developed uses 
changes in the proportion of the black population and changes in 
geographic concentration of blacks (competition for black labor) to 
explain changes in the school year length. Empirical results of pooled 
cross-sectional, time-series data showed the anticipated signs. A 
decrease in the proportion of blacks caused an increase in the school year 
length, as did an increase in the competition for black laborers. 
Next, Margo considered the tax burden of black schools and black 
mobility. [Margo, 1988] Margo's mobility model suggests that blacks would 
be taxed more than the level of local public goods they received would 
call for. The only time this would not be true would be if blacks were 
perfectly mobile. If they were perfectly mobile, such excessive taxing 
would drive black labor from that community. 
Many have theorized that blacks were subsidizing white schools. 
"...Early twentieth century writers, such as Charles Coon and W.B.B. 
OuBois, claimed that black schools were not a burden to white taxpayers 
and that blacks were subsidizing whites in some states." [Margo, 1988, p. 
24] More recently, Richard Smith [1974] measured racial burden of school 
taxes. He concluded that in most states, blacks were subsidizing white 
education. 
Margo [1988] finds problems with the way Smith derived his range of 
tax burdens. Margo claims that "...if his [Smith's] lower bound estimates 
are used, blacks were subsidizing whites in only three states in 1910..." 
[Margo, 1988, p. 26] However, like Margo's claim, empirical studies have 
shown that blacks did not subsidize white schools. They show that just 
the opposite was true. 
Kousser [1980], using a "black balance of payments" measure, found 
the whites to be subsidizing black education. The "black balance of 
payments" was the difference between black educational expenditures and 
black educational taxes. He found the "black balance of payments" to be 
positive, even after disfranchisement. 
Prltchett [1989] also investigated the issue of who subsidized whom 
in a segregated school setting. He delved into the incidence of the 
property tax. His conclusion was that the more elastic the supply of 
property (landowners) relative to the demand for property (laborers), the 
more chance there was of blacks paying entirely for their own education. 
Such a result hinged on the fact that the tax burden could be shifted from 
landowners back to the workers in the form of higher rents. Pritchett 
does not provide any empirical evidence, but rather only sets up the 
conditions under which blacks may have paid for their own education. 
Considering that labor was probably relatively more mobile than was 
capital and land (usually assumed fixed), Pritchett's model would back 
Kousser's results. 
So, if the expenditures on black schools exceeded the revenues from 
black taxes, and given that perfect mobility was implausible, another 
explanation was needed to explain why whites tended to subsidize black 
schools. Margo explains that since school expenditures were derived from 
property taxes, whites would have a large share of the tax burden. 
However, such an explanation still does not answer the question as to why 
there was investment in black schools at all. 
Even though blacks had the right to vote in the period from the 
1920's through the 1950's, it is common knowledge that most governing 
bodies, including school boards, were almost exclusively white. With the 
power governing the provision of public services predominantly in the 
hands of the whites, it's a wonder that black public schools existed at 
all. This issue has become known as Myrdal's paradox. [Myrdal, 1944] 
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Since blacks would support their own private schools, public schools are 
the only issue here. 
Various explanations have been advanced to resolve this paradox. A 
few seem to predominate. The first explanation came from Myrdal himself. 
He perceived that Americans felt they had a moral responsibility to 
educate all. He states that, "The American Creed showed itself strong 
enough not to allow the sacred principle of public education (for blacks) 
to succumb in the South." (Myrdal, 1944, p. 889] 
A second explanation would be the "separate-but-equal" provision of 
the law established by the Plessy vs. Ferguson Case of 1896. Such a 
provision in the law was said to cause some school boards and local 
authorities to worry about legal action which might occur if public 
education were not provided to both blacks and whites alike. However, it 
appears that there was a lot of slack in the way the separate-but-egual 
doctrine was interpreted. So, whether the threat of legal action was 
large or not is debatable. 
A third explanation, and one which may have the most merit, was 
advanced originally by Richard Freeman [1973] and further by Margo [1990]. 
They suggested that whites may have been willing to subsidize black 
schools with the hope of reaping the economic benefits of a better-
educated black labor force. A better education for blacks would, in turn, 
cause the productivity of capital owned by whites to increase. 
Fishback [1989] also addressed the issue as to why whites would be 
willing to invest in black education. His study investigated coal 
companies and segregated schools in West Virginia in the early 1900's. 
The reason he used coal companies is because they were the major employers 
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in West Virginia at that time and they often faced very tight labor 
markets. 
With tight competitive labor markets, the coal companies had to give 
some incentive for workers to locate in their particular community. These 
incentives came in the form of higher wages and improved local public 
goods, such as education. 
In addition to attracting a greater number of miners, 
the coal companies felt that improving education would 
attract more productive and more stable workers with 
families. With labor at a premium, low spending on 
the education of black children was also costly to the 
coal employer because it limited his ability to 
attract black workers, potentially leaving the company 
short of its optimal work force. Further the company 
could reap more benefits by extra spending on black 
education than on white education. Expenditures per 
pupil on white school greatly exceeded those on black 
schools elsewhere. Given diminishing marginal utility 
for education, another dollar spent on their child's 
education was likely to attract more black than white 
workers. [Fishback, 1989, pp. 314-315] 
There is much literary support of Freeman's idea, but little 
empirical work dealing with this idea is evident in the literature. The 
statistical analyses done in chapters III and IV showed positive shocks in 
either expenditures or attendance (i.e., increases in educational inputs) 
would have significant positive effects on the value of assets (capital 
and property). This fact can be seen in the dynamic elasticity values for 
random shocks in either variable, but especially attendance. Positive 
shocks to attendance caused large positive responses in asset values. 
This was found to be true in all three samples (white, black, and 
combined). However, the most significant result was with black attendance 
causing a dynamic elastic response in real assets of 3.04. 
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The goal of this chapter is to provide a theoretical model which 
explains why there was an incentive (on the part of a white-dominated 
school system) to invest in blacks schools during an era of segregation 
and why increases in attendance would cause increases in property values. 
The next section develops a model which would support the empirical 
results obtained in chapter III and chapter IV. 
C. Theoretical Model 
The framework for model building begins by employing Freeman's idea 
that white capitalists would be willing to invest in black education, 
provided that they benefitted economically. Freeman's idea can be 
formulated in a simple profit-maximizing model for a representative firm 
and a utility-maximizing model for a representative household, both of 
whom were involved in educational investment. The firm's investment would 
be through dollars spent on education. The household's investment would 
be through attendance. Such models would incorporate the idea of 
investing in human capital in the current period, with an expected return 
on the investment in a future time period. 
The investigation will involve looking at the profit-maximizing 
firm's and utility-maximizing household's decisions in period one. First-
order conditions will be derived and then interpreted. Period two will be 
investigated in a similar manner. 
1. Period one 
a. The profit-maximizing firm The model selected for the firm is 
a two-period, profit-maximizing model in which the firm invests in 
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schooling in the first period. The firm then employs the educated workers 
and reaps the economic benefits of a better-educated labor force In the 
second period. 
The empirical work done in chapters III and IV demonstrated that a 
one-time shock In human capital Investment would increase property values. 
In this model, profits are investigated. The reason for investigating 
profits, rather than property values, is that firms are assumed to be the 
primary holders of land and capital. If their profits increase, they 
would be capitalized into property values because current land prices, 
will equal the present value of current and expected dividends from 
holding land. 
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So, if skills acquired from education are firm-specific or location-
specific, an increment in human capital in one location would not be 
valued by other firms or other locations. If the increment is not 
observable to other firms or other locations, the market would not 
incorporate it into the market wage. The firm would appropriate the 
return on the human capital by paying wages below the marginal product. 
In turn, these profits would be capitalized into property values in the 
relevant county. 
It is also likely that some of the private investment in education is 
determined by parental tastes. Nonpecuniary returns from, for example, 
more able or cultured children, will also influence how many years of 
schooling children receive or how many days per year children attend. If 
<l+r) (5.1) 
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parents' taste for education differ across counties, this will cause 
differences In attendance and human capital production across counties, 
even If children are receiving the same years of education. Unanticipated 
changes in parental tastes will cause unanticipated changes in human 
capital production in a given county that may not be observable in other 
counties. If labor markets clear at expected and not actual marginal 
products, firms in the counties with unexpectedly high attendance will be 
paying wages below realized marginal product. 
In the first period, a firm would face the typical decisions of how 
much capital, K, to employ and how much uneducated labor, H^, to employ. 
Capital and labor are the sole components in a constant-returns production 
function. The firm would also face competitive factor prices of r and w 
respectively. If a firm considers educational expenditures, the model 
gets a bit more complicated. A firm must add the per capita cost of 
education to its expenses and considers the future (period two) return on 
such expenses. 
To incorporate educational expenditures into a profit-maximizing 
framework,' the firm must consider the discounted returns to investing in 
education today relative to the dollar expenditure today. As with period 
one, a constant-returns production function is used for period two 
production and the production would Include a human capital component 
resulting from the education received in period one, as well as capital 
(assumed to be fixed from period one), and uneducated labor. 
It was often said that an education made blacks even more mobile. 
Without an education, they remained where they were. However, an 
education opened up many more career opportunities within a given 
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community as well as in other communities. Margo [1990, pp. 110-111] 
found that in 1900, about 12.3% of educated adult males tended to migrate. 
Whereas, only about 3.9% of uneducated adult males did. The numbers were 
quite comparable for 1940. The percentage of adult males who migrated 
with 0 to 1 year of education was 8.7. Adult males with 9 to 12 years of 
education migrated approximately 29.8 percent of the time. Therefore, it 
would not be unrealistic to assume imperfect mobility of labor for this 
model, especially since the target group is grade school educated labor. 
The idea that labor was not perfectly mobile would back the assumption 
that labor markets would clear at the expected marginal product rather 
than actual marginal product. 
Migration theory states that a person would only migrate to another 
area if the economic benefits from doing so exceeded the economic costs. 
[Sjaastad, 1962] Black migration was often due to higher wage incentives. 
Margo presented evidence to support such a migration theory. He showed 
that black males in 1939 who migrated received approximately 42.5 (0-4 
years of schooling) to 46.4 (5-8 years of schooling) percent higher annual 
earnings than did those who did not migrate. Also, those with 5 to 8 
years of schooling had a higher migration rate than did those with 0 to 4 
years. [Margo, 1990, pp. 118-119] 
Even though imperfect mobility is assumed, some incentive from the 
community (firms) had to be offered to the educated blacks to keep them 
from exercising any newly found mobility due to the education they 
received. This incentive is incorporated into the model in the form of a 
second-period "educational wage." This is a competitive market wage for 
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educated labor, which is higher than the market wage paid to uneducated 
laborers. 
So, the model for period one profit maximization incorporates the 
idea of a firm maximizing profits in period one with a constant-returns 
production function having inputs of capital and uneducated labor, 
expenses due to capital and labor usage, and expenses due to educational 
investment. Also included in the period one profit maximization would be 
the discounted expected returns to education in period two. The 
discounted expected returns part of the model uses a constant-returns 
production function, incorporating a human capital component. The model 
further includes expenses due to capital and uneducated labor, and a 
special wage paid to educated labor. 
The firm must determine the optimal level of capital in period one, 
the optimal amounts of uneducated labor in period one and period two, and 
the educational investment they are willing to make as well as the number 
of educated laborers they are willing to hire in period two (or the total 
number for whom they are willing to pay out educational expenditures in 
period one). The firm assumes that attendance is independent from their 
decision and that the number of children to be educated in period one will 
be the number of educated laborers employed in period 2. The rental rate 
of capital and the uneducated wage are determined by the competitive 
market. 
In the second period, the decision for the firm is more simplistic. 
The firm needs only to determine the optimal level of uneducated labor to 
hire. The firm assumes that attendance, their investment in education, 
the number of educated laborers, the educational wage, the rental rate of 
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capital, and the uneducated wage are predetermined or given by the market. 
No inflation is assumed between periods one and two. 
b. The firm model The firm will maximize profits in period one 
according to the model laid out in equation 5.2. The variables used in 
the equation are described in Table 5.1. 
TTi = pf(K,Hi) - rK - wHi - EpN + fl[pg(K,H2,h{A,Ep)N) - rK 
- WH2 - WghN] (5.2) 
The production functions (f and g) consist of capital and labor 
components. Capital, once selected in period one, is assumed to remain 
constant through period two. In g, the second-period production function, 
educated labor is taken into account in the form of hN. N is the number 
of educated laborers and h is the amount of human capital per laborer. 
Variable h depends on both the attendance level and the firm's per capita 
educational expenditure level. hN gives the total amount of human capital 
which can be added into the production function due to a better-educated 
labor force. 
Ep is the per capita educational expenditure by the firm. EpN is the 
total cost of education that the firm pays out. Both Ej. and N are choice 
variables for the firm. 
The first part of the equation deals with the total revenues and 
total costs faced by the firm in period one. The second part of the 
equation is the present value of expected profits in period two, when the 
educational component of the labor force takes effect. 
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Table 5.1. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
firm's discounted profits (period one and period two) 
in period one 
it2 firm's profits in period two 
p price of output 
f production function in period one 
g production function in period two 
r rental rate of capital in periods one and two 
w market wage in periods one and two (no inflation) 
WQ educational wage 
Wg expected educational wage 
K amount of capital used in periods one and two 
amount of uneducated labor used in period one 
Hg amount of uneducated labor used in period two 
h amount of human capital per educated person 
Ep firm's educational expenditures 
A level of attendance 
A® expected level of attendance 
N number educated in period one, number of educated 
workers hired in period two (first model presented); 
number educated in period one (second model presented) 
Ng number of educated workers hired in period two 
B discount factor 
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Firms will only invest in education now if they perceive economic 
benefits resulting from such educational expenditures in the future. This 
is the purpose of the second term. The firm expects to pay out the value 
of the marginal product of human capital due to people attending school, 
WQ, times the amount of human capital per educated laborer, h, times the 
number educated in period one, N. 
The wage going to educated laborers (equation 5.2) is equal to the 
value of the marginal product of human capital times the percentage of 
human capital due to people attending school. 
hnA 
We = ——P9h (5.3) 
h 
It is the WQ term which is the pre-contracted wage that the firm agrees to 
pay to educational returns per unit of human capital. People know before 
period two that this is the wage educated laborers will receive. In the 
model, both Wg and w are assumed to equalize across counties. 
The production functions, f and g, are assumed to be linearly 
homogeneous and twice differentiable with fj^, f^^, g^/ g^^, g^ > 0 and 
^KK' 9kK' 9H2H2' 9hh ^  The function h(A,Ep) is also assumed to 
be linearly homogeneous. 
c. The firm's first-order conditions In the first period, p, r, 
w and JÎ are assumed to be exogenous. Therefore, the first-order 
conditions are taken with respect to K, H2, Ep, and N. In optimizing 
it is assumed that there is no inflation across time periods. The profit-
maximizing firm would have the following first-order conditions for period 
one. 
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Stti 
= pf* - r + Gfpgx - r) = 0 (5.4) 
dn 
aHi 
^ - W = 0 (5.5) 
ÔTTi 
— = G(pgH - w) = 0 (5.6) ÔH, "2 
dn 
— = -N + GpghhE-N - fiph^E Ag^N - Bphj^Ag^hhE N2 = 0 (5.7) 
ôEp " " "" '^F 
SN 
= -Ep + «pg^h - flph^Ag^hhN - flph^^Agi^ = 0 (5.8) 
d. Interpretation of the first-order conditions The first-order 
conditions can be summarized in the following ways. Condition 1 (equation 
5.4) states that the sum of the values of the marginal product of capital, 
both present (period one) and discounted future (period two), equals the 
present rental rate of capital (period one) plus the discounted future 
rental rate of capital (period two). This is expressed in equation 5.9. 
p(fK + Ag^) = r(l + J3) (5.8) 
Condition 2 (equation 5.5) implies that the value of the marginal 
product of uneducated labor in period one equals the uneducated wage in 
period one. In other words, the firm should continue to hire labor up to 
the point at which the value of the marginal product due to labor is equal 
to the competitive market wage. 
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PfHi = " <5.10) 
Condition 3 (equation 5.6) is similar to condition 2 in that the 
value of the marginal product of uneducated labor in period two is equal 
to the uneducated wage. Given the model's assumption of no inflation, the 
uneducated wage across periods is the same across periods. 
PSHg = " (5.11) 
The fourth first order condition (equation 5.7) states that a firm 
would want to increase Ep up to the point at which the last dollar of 
educational expenditures is equal to the discounted net value of the 
marginal product of educational expenditures. 
1 = flp[gh% - (hAEpASh + Nh^Ag^hhEp)] (5.12) 
From the final first-order condition it is concluded that it is 
beneficial to allow students to enroll up to the point at which the cost 
per student (Bp) is equal to the discounted value of the marginal product 
of educated labor net of cost. 
Ep = Gp(ghh - h^^Ag^hhN - h^Ag^) (5.13) 
With all of these first-order conditions considered, a reduced form 
for Bp can be defined. This reduced form demonstrates that the 
expenditures per pupil are a function of prices, uneducated as well as the 
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expected educated wage, the expected level of attendance (the household's 
investment in education), and the discount factor. 
Bp = Eptp, w, v}Q ,  a®, fl) (5.14) 
e. A second firm model A slightly modified version of the above 
model is useful to derive more explicit predictions. The above model 
assumed that the number of children educated in period one would be 
exactly to the number of educated laborers hired in period two. This 
model makes the more reasonable assumption that the number educated in 
period one, N, is exogenous to the firm and may differ from the number 
hired in the second period, N2. A fixed educational wage is also assumed 
in this model. The Wg variable is now the wage to educated labor, rather 
than the wage to a unit of human capital as was previously the case. 
Attendance is still treated as a decision made by households and therefore 
exogenous to the firm. 
TTi = pf(K,Hi) - rK - wHi - EpN + fl[pg(K,H2,h(A,Ep)N2) - rK 
- WH2 - WgN2] (5.15) 
f. First-order conditions for the second firm model The 
following first order conditions result when profits are maximized. 
Stti 
= PfR - ^ Gfpgx - r) = 0 (5.16) 
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ÔTT]^ 
aHi 
diT^  
- P^Hi - w = 0 (5.17) 
= A(pgHs - w) = 0 (5.18) 
aH2 "2 
ÔTTi 
—^ = -N + Gpghhs Ng = 0 (5.19) 
OEp 1 
dn-\ 
— = «pg^h - fîWg =0 (5.20) 
2 
The first three first-order conditions retain the same interpretation as 
before. Equation 5.19 would state that the cost of increasing school 
quality should be set equal to the discounted value of the marginal 
product to the firm due to increased educational expenditures times the 
number who will be hired in period two. The last first-order conditions 
states that the educational wage should be set equal to the value of the 
marginal product of human capital times the amount of human capital per 
laborer. 
In this model it is of interest to determine the relationship between 
expenditures per pupil and the educational wage, between the number of 
children attending school and the expenditures per pupil, and between the 
educational wage and the number of educated workers the firm is willing to 
hire in period two. If one were to take the total derivative of equation 
5.19, one could derive the following comparative static result. 
1 
Bp[ghhN2^hEp + 9hN2hEpEp] 
(5.21) 
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This says that if the current number of children attending school were to 
rise, the firm would respond by decreasing its educational expenditure per 
pupil. This is consistent with the quantity/quality model of human 
capital investment. For school districts, the cost of increasing school 
inputs by one dollar per pupil is the number of pupils in the district. 
Taking the total derivative of equation 5.20, yields a comparative 
static for the relationship between the educational wage and the firm's 
expenditures per pupil. 
dEp 1 > 
dWe Pghhl^EpN2h + PGhhEp 
< 0 (5.22) 
The first term in the denominator is negative and the second term is 
positive. Therefore, increasing the educational wage has an ambiguous 
effect on educational expenditures per pupil. This means that the extent 
of wage discrimination against blacks has an uncertain effect on the 
incentive for firms to invest in black human capital. 
The total derivative of equation 5.20, would also yield the 
following. 
dNg 
—72 < 0 (5.23) 
dWg h^P9hh 
This states that if the educated wage were increased, the firm would 
unambiguously decrease the number of educated workers it would be willing 
to hire in period two. 
e. The utilitv-maximizina household At the same time the firm is 
investing in education in order to maximize profits, the household is 
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investing in education to maximize utility. As with the firm, a household 
would have to consider two distinct time periods. A representative 
household, in a given community, is assumed to consist of one adult 
laborer who works full time, earning income in period one and Y2 
period two. Further, the household has a child who's time can be divided 
between working or attending school. It is assumed that each child who 
attends school in period one expects to receive the educational wage, Wg, 
in period two upon completion of schooling. 
The cost of education to the household takes the form of the foregone 
wages the child could have earned working at the competitive unskilled or 
uneducated market wage. The household knows that the child will receive 
the pre-contracted wage in period two if its child attends school in 
period one. 
The household maximizes utility with three components entering its 
utility function. These components are consumption in period one, C^, 
consumption in period two, C2, and the amount of human capital per child, 
h. As with the typical constrained utility maximization problem, the 
household faces a budget constraint. The budget constraint is such that 
the incomes earned by the adult and the child in period one plus the 
discounted earnings of both in period two must equal the spending in 
period one plus the discounted spending in period two. 
f. The household model The household's constrained utility 
maximization problem in period one would be as follows. The variable 
descriptions are listed in Table 5.2. 
= U(Ci,C2,h{A,Ep);T) + + w(l-A) - pC^ + GfYg + Wgh - pCg)) (5.24) 
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Table 5.2. Variable definitions for the household model 
Variable Variable definition 
household's constrained utility-maximization in period 
one 
^2 household's constrained utility-maximization in period 
two 
U household's utility function (homogeneous of degree 
zero) 
consumption in period one 
C2 consumption in period two 
h human capital per capita due to education 
A attendance level 
Ep educational expenditures per pupil by firm 
Ep® expected educational expenditures per pupil by firm 
Y2 adult income in period one 
Yg adult income in period two 
w wage for uneducated laborers 
p price of consumption in periods one and two (no 
inflation) 
WQ educational wage 
WQ expected educational wage 
T tastes 
A. marginal utility of income 
Si discount factor 
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g. The household'B first-order conditions Equations 5.25 through 
5.28 are the resulting first-order conditions which result from the 
household's constrained utility maximization. 
a^ i 
-- = = 0 (5.25) 
3^1 
— — — A./3p = 0 (5.26) 
3C, ^2 
asf 
dh 
asfi 
— = Uh^A - Aw + AGphaAghhha + Aflph^^gj^ + Xflph^^Ag^ = 0 (5.27) 
ax 
= ?! + w(l-A) - pC^ + J3(Y2 + Wgh - pCg) = 0 (5.28) 
h. Interpretation of the first-order conditions Combining 
equations 5.25 and 5.26, a typical result can be obtained. Consumption 
will be allocated across periods such that the ratio of the marginal 
utilities, Uq^ /U^^, is equal to the inverse of the discount rate, 1/fi. 
The third first-order condition (equation 5.27), states that 
households should have their children attend school up to the point at 
which the marginal utility associated with attendance is equal to the net 
value of the marginal product due to attending school. The following 
reduced-form expression for attendance can be derived from the first-order 
conditions. 
A = A(p, w, Y^, ^2' EpG, Wg, fl, T) (5.29) 
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2. Period Two 
Period two is the time horizon in which the children who were 
educated in period one enter the labor force as educated laborers. 
Therefore, they must be incorporated into the production function. 
Educated laborers receive an educational wage as a reward for their 
attendance. The educational wage was pre-contracted in period one and is 
considered to be exogenous in period two. 
a. The firm's profit-maximizing model The firm's profit 
maximization is quite simple in period two. This model for period two 
would be consistent with either of the period-one firm models presented 
earlier. If the first model is assumed, the only choice variable is the 
amount of uneducated labor to hire. Capital, K, is assumed to be fixed at 
the optimal level selected in period one. The level of human capital, the 
market wages, and the rental rate of capital are also assumed to be 
exogenous. If the second model is assumed, the number of educated workers 
to hire also becomes a decision for the firm in period two. 
The firm's profit-maximization model for period two is expressed in 
equation 5.30. 
7T2 = pg(K,h(A,Ep)N,H2) - WghN - rK - WH2 (5.30) 
The variables used in the profit equation are the same as those in period 
one. For the second model, N would be replaced with N2 in equation 5.30. 
A description of the variables used can be found in Table 5.1. Further 
explanation of the terms can also be found under the period one section 
dealing with the firm. 
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Because all else is assumed to be exogenous, the firm's only decision 
variable in period two is the amount of uneducated labor, H2, to hire (for 
the first model). When the firm optimizes with regard to H2, the 
following first-order condition results. 
ÔTTo 
— = pgaj - " • 0 ( = -31) 
This condition implies that uneducated workers will be hired up to the 
point at which the value of the marginal product is equal to the market 
wage in period two for uneducated labor. 
If the second model is considered another first-order condition 
becomes relevant. 
Stto 
—— = pg^h - Wg = 0 (5.32) 
0N2 
This condition states that educated labor should be hired in period two up 
to the point at which the value of the marginal product of human capital 
is equal to the educational wage. 
b. The household's utilitv maximizing model In period two, the 
household's decision is quite trivial. The only choice the household has 
to make in the second period is how much to consume given the budget 
constraint. The household's model for period two is expressed in equation 
5.33. 
^2 = 0(0%) + A.(Y2 + Wgh - pCg) (5.33) 
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Optimization would occur with regard to C2 and X only. All else is 
assumed to be constant in period two. The resulting first-order 
conditions when optimizing are expressed in equations 5.34 and 5.35. 
aa, 
-a;-- - "C, - p - 0 (5.34) 
= Y2 + "eh - PC2 = 0 (5.35) 
For utility maximization, the marginal utility of consumption in the 
second period must be equal to the price of consumption in that period. 
Also, the income from the parents and the educated child must equal the 
total amount of consumption. 
D. The Incentive to Invest in Education 
Part of the goal of this chapter was to prove theoretically that 
incentive did exist to invest in both black and white schools alike. The 
answer to this question lies in the idea that firms must have benefitted 
economically for such investment. The fact that the first-order 
conditions for the firm show that Ep must be positive for profit 
maximization demonstrates that economic benefit did exist to investing in 
educational expenditures. The pecuniary returns to a better-educated 
labor force were incentive enough to invest in both black and white 
schools. 
The other part of the goal of this chapter was to answer the question 
as to why investment in education would cause property values to rise. If 
the actual level of human capital in period two exceeded the expected 
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level, then firms should reap the benefits of the better-educated labor 
force in that their profits would rise. If their profits rise, these 
profits would then be capitalized into property values. This was the 
possible argument laid out in words at the beginning of this chapter. 
However, to this point, this issue has not been addressed in any type of 
formal proof. A theoretical demonstration of this possibility follows. 
1. A one-time shock in attendance 
A situation such as stated above could arise if there were a one­
time, unanticipated unit shock in attendance, all else constant. Given 
that today's attendance would be correlated with past attendance plus an 
error term, an unanticipated shock in attendance could result only from a 
one-time unit shock in a component of attendance which is exclusive to 
attendance. Of all the factors affecting attendance, the household's 
taste for education would be the only factor exclusive to it. A change in 
a household's taste pattern for education could generate such an 
unanticipated shock. 
This type of unanticipated shock would not be capable of being 
captured by the market. Therefore, wages could not reflect the shock and 
would leave firms reaping the full economic benefit in terms of increased 
profits. Tiebout would say that property values should not change due to 
investment in public goods; the market should incorporate it all and 
property values should be unchanged. However, if there is private 
investment (unanticipated attendance) in a public good which the market 
cannot observe, the profits would then be capitalized into property 
values. 
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2. A theoretical proof 
The theoretical proof that such a result would occur is as follows. 
This theoretical proof uses the first version of the firm's model. If the 
production function exhibits constant returns to scale, then using Euler's 
Theorem, the following can be said to be true. 
9 = SK* + 9h(hAA + + 9H2H2 (5.36) 
Rearranging and solving for g^^ equation 5.37 results. 
g - g^K - gh(hAA + hg Ej,)N 
gH2 (5.37, 
Plugging g^^ into the first-order condition, a reduced-form expression for 
optimal level of Hg, Hg*, can be found. 
Hj* = f(A, Ep, K, N, w) (5.38) 
If were plugged back into the equation for wg, the optimal level of 
profits could be calculated. 
The question now is what if the actual level of attendance exceeds 
the level which was expected, all else constant? Such a condition would 
arise if there were a shock in the attendance level. Do the profits in 
period two rise? The answer to this is yes. Again, this can be shown 
with a few mathematical steps. 
Plugging Hg* into the TTg equation, the model becomes equation 5.39. 
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TTg = pg(K,H2*,h(a,Ep)N) - WghN - rK - wHg* (5.39) 
Taking the derivative of 1^2 with respect to A will determine whether 
profits rise, fall, or remain unchanged due to the actual level of 
attendance exceeding the expected level. Taking the derivative, the 
following is obtained. 
ÔTTo SHo* 3Hp* 
IT' "  ( = - " )  
To simplify the right-hand side, one can use the first-order condition 
(equation 5.11), w = pg^^. When this is plugged into the derivative, the 
result is that profits in period two would unambiguously rise due to an 
unanticipated shock in attendance. Equation 5.41 shows this result. 
dn2* 
dR. 
= pghhaN > 0. (5.41) 
This result proves that if households take advantage of the education 
provided more than was anticipated by firms, the firm reaps pure economic 
profits. This result has some intuitive appeal in that the only place a 
shock in human capital would come into play in the profit-maximizing 
problem would be the production function. The level of human capital 
determines the educational wage, but the educational wage is pre­
contracted and would not change in the event of a shock in attendance. 
Therefore, the firm reaps the rewards in terms of additional revenues 
collected and pays no more in wages than was pre-contracted. 
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K. Conclusions 
The goal of this chapter was to present a theoretical model 
encompassing causal relationships among variables used in the VAR 
analysis. In particular, the theoretical model was to demonstrate why 
their was incentive by whites to invest in both black and white education 
alike and why property values might rise due to investment in education. 
The goal was accomplished, such a theoretical model was presented. The 
model demonstrated that there was incentive to invest. Profit 
maximization showed that expenditures per pupil should be positive. 
Pecuniary returns to a better-educated labor force were the motivating 
factor. Further it was shown that if there were unanticipated investments 
in education due to consumer tastes, then firms reaped the economic 
profits and the fact that these profits would be capitalized into property 
values. 
The next chapter uses the findings of the VAR and the reduced forms 
for educational expenditures and attendance derived in this chapter to 
formulate a model of investment in education. This model is then tested 
using more "traditional" techniques of regression analysis. 
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VI. EDUCATIONAL INVESIMENXi A FINAL EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A. Introduction 
To this point, the issue of discrimination has not been addressed 
explicitly. Taste for discrimination is very hard to quantify into a 
variable which can be used in regression analysis. This chapter attempts 
to incorporate characteristics of the public school system and the private 
school system which have already been addressed, and to further 
incorporate a taste for discrimination into one final empirical analysis 
of the Maryland school districts to better explain why there was 
investment in education during an era of segregation. By incorporating a 
taste for discrimination into the analysis, the picture is completed. 
The literature has already been reviewed for both investment in 
public schools (chapter XI) and investment in private schools (chapter IV) 
and reviewed for the issue of race and how race affects the investment in 
education (chapter V). From work discussed in these literature reviews 
and from the theoretical derivations in chapter V a model is developed 
which incorporates the desired components mentioned above. The next 
section explains the components to be included in the analysis. The third 
section discusses the empirical approach that was taken. The empirical 
findings are presented in the fourth section and the last section offers 
conclusions. 
B. The Model 
For the this empirical investigation, the model used to capture 
public and private school characteristics as well as a taste for 
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discrimination is a static model which leads to a reduced form for real 
educational expenditures per pupil much like that derived in chapter V. 
Such a reduced form describes the "firm's" investment in education. From 
chapter III it was determined that attendance in the public schools, the 
birth rate per thousand in the population, and real assets were 
significant in determining real expenditures per pupil. The analysis in 
chapter IV confirmed the significance of attendance in the public schools 
and real assets in determining real expenditures per pupil. It further 
indicated that total private school enrollment was significant in causing 
real expenditures (with the exception of the black sample). 
To quantify taste for discrimination a change in private school 
enrollment variable was used. This variable was created by employing the 
idea of revealed preference. If a taste for discrimination did exist 
during an era of segregated schooling, it would be hard to pinpoint this 
taste. However, such a taste for discrimination might become more 
revealed after schools were forced to become integrated in that those 
possessing a taste for discrimination might send their children to private 
schools. Measuring the change in private school enrollments from 1955 to 
1960 in a given county relative to the populations of the counties at 
those particular times seemed a logical way to quantify a taste for 
discrimination. If a taste for discrimination existed during the 
segregated era, it would be revealed in terms of "white flight" to private 
schools when public schools became integrated. 
Therefore, combining the theory of chapter V and the empirical 
results of chapters III and IV, the following reduced form for educational 
investment was derived. Most studies found in the literature dealing with 
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the public-private school choice and discrimination include a percentage 
of blacks in the community variable (or a percentage of whites variable). 
Inclusion of such a variable did not seem appropriate for this 
investigation given that the time period being studied involved segregated 
schools. (The studies where such a variable was included involved time 
periods where integrated schools existed.) Table 6.1 describes the 
variables in the reduced-form expression. 
REXPP = f(RASSPP, TPRIVTCH, NCHTPOP, MDWAGE, ENR5560, TREND) (6.1) 
RBXPPtpt = a + fl^RASSPPi^t + GgTPRIVTCHi^t + GgNCHTPOPi % + 
B^MDWAGEi^t + GgBNRSSeOi t + BgTREND^^t + ^ijt 
i — X f • * * / tï/ t — 1 y . . . f T (6.2) 
An increase in the total number of children enrolled in private 
schools relative to the total number of children in the population would 
be expected to cause an increase in real expenditures in the public 
school. This expectation is based on the VAR results in chapter IV and 
the fact that previous empirical work shows that communities tend to 
increase school quality (in terms of expenditures per pupil) when they are 
losing their enrollments to private schools. By increasing the per pupil 
expenditure level, a community attempts to gain its enrollments back. 
Another explanation for this kind of result was put forth by Erekson 
[1982]. He claimed that the scaling effect might dominate the support 
effect when there are low levels of private school enrollment. There will 
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be less students in the public schools, but with almost the same amount of 
tax support. 
Real assets, if considered a measure of wealth would be expected to 
have a positive coefficient. A positive sign on this coefficient would 
indicate that the more wealth consumers have, the more they are willing to 
invest in education. As with the private school enrollments regression, 
the predicted sign on MDWAGE was uncertain. 
With any type of demand function, the regression should include a 
price variable. However, because expenditures are used as the endogenous 
variable, it is not appropriate to use measures such as teachers' salaries 
as measures of the price of education. These measures would be too highly 
correlated to educational expenditures to give consistent results. 
Therefore, the quantity-quality model was drawn upon for an answer to this 
problem. This model states that there is a trade-off between the quantity 
of children and the quality per child. In this light, the number of 
children in the population relative to the total population can be thought 
of as a "price" variable. The price of raising expenditures per pupil by 
one dollar is the number of children in the system. Such an expectation 
is also consistent with the theory derived in the previous chapter. 
If a taste for discrimination were in existence during the segregated 
era, one would anticipate that there would be "white flight" when 
educational segregation ended. In other words, one would expect that 
private school enrollments would increase significantly upon the end of 
segregation. One would anticipate the coefficient on this variable, 
ENR5560, to enter the equation for the black sample with a negative sign. 
The negative sign would indicate that a taste for discrimination did exist 
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and this taste for discrimination would cause the expenditures per pupil 
in the black school systems to decrease. 
The empirical analysis in chapter IV showed that private school 
enrollments were quite exogenous in nature relative to the other variables 
being considered in that particular analysis. However, because the 
empirical work discussed in the literature review (chapter IV) indicated 
that there were other factors affecting private school enrollments, the 
model for this investigation was expanded to further include a reduced 
form for private school enrollments. Private school enrollments can be 
expressed as a function of income, the cost of attending a private school, 
tastes, and a measure of wealth. This reduced form is expressed in 
equations 6.3 and 6.4 and the variable definitions can be found in Table 
6.1. 
TPRIVTCH = f(RASSPP, NPRIV, PCTCATH, MDWAGE, TREND) (6.3) 
TPRIVTCHi^t = Y + ôiRASSPPi^t + ëgNPRIVi^t + GgPCTCATHi^t + 
ôjMDWAGEi^t + SgTRENDi^t + /^i,t t=l,...,T (6.4) 
It would be anticipated that total private school enrollments would 
rise if a person's wealth were to increase or if the availability of 
private schools would increase. Great density or availability of schools 
should respond like a decrease in the price of private schools and cause 
enrollments to rise. Further one would predict that the greater the 
Catholic population in any given county, the greater would be the 
enrollment in private schools. The proxy for Maryland manufacturing wages 
120 
Table 6.1. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
REXPP 
RASSPP 
TPRIVTCH 
NCHTPOP 
MDWA6B 
ENR5560 
NPRIV 
PCTCATH 
total current expenses (in real terms) per pupil belonging 
total assessment taxable at full rate (in real terms) per 
person in the total population (county) 
total number of children (both black and white) in the 
population (county) enrolled in private schools relative to 
the total number of children (both black and white) in the 
population (county) 
total number of children (black, white, or combined 
depending on sample) in the population (county) relative to 
the total population (county) 
proxy for Maryland wage; payroll index relative to 
employment index for combined manufacturing industries in 
Maryland counties 
the difference in private school enrollments in 1955 
relative to total population of grade school children 
(county) in 1955 and private school enrollments in 1960 
relative to total population of grade school children 
(county) in 1960 
total number of private schools in the county 
the percent of the population (county) who are Catholic 
TREND the time trend variable, defined by the last two digits of 
the year 
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was the variable where there was some uncertainty as to what sign the 
coefficient should have. If the wage acted like income in the equation, 
private school enrollment would rise if it were increased. However, if 
the wage was considered to be the cost of education (foregone 
opportunity), then the coefficient would be negative. 
If real assets are a basis for taxation in a given community, and the 
primary purpose of taxation is for the provision of educational services, 
then real assets may function as a cost in the private school enrollment 
equation rather than a wealth variable. The idea of opportunity cost is 
involved again. If a consumer's real assets were to rise, one would 
expect that real expenditures on public schools would rise as a result. 
The opportunity cost of sending children to a private school would rise if 
the quality of the public schools increased (greater real expenditures) 
and decrease private school enrollments as a result. 
C. The Data 
The data set used is a cross-sectional time series with 28 years of 
data for 23 white school systems and 22 black school systems. The data 
concentrate on elementary schools, covering grades 1 through 8. The real 
expenditures (REXPPA), real assets (RASSPP),_ total number of children 
enrolled in private schools (TPRIVTCH), total number of private schools 
(TPRIV), and the change in enrollment from 1955 to 1966 (ENR5560) data 
were all taken from the Annual Reports of the State of Marvland Board of 
Education. The population figures used to calculate the number of 
children relative to the population (NCHTPOP) and the denominators of the 
RASSPP and the TPRIVTCH variables were taken from an unpublished vital 
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statistics table received from officials of the State of Maryland Board of 
Education. The employment and payroll index numbers of Maryland 
manufacturing industries used to calculate the wage proxy, MDWAGE, were 
taken from the Reports of the Commissioner of Labor and Statistics of 
Marvland. The percentage of Catholics in the population, PCTCATH, data 
was taken from the U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. 
Religious Bodies, Summary and Detailed Tables (1926 and 1936), and from 
Churches and Church Membership in the United States; an Enumeration and 
Analvsis bv Counties. States, and Regions. 1956-1958. Sample statistics 
are presented in Table 6.2. TREND, a time trend variable, was also 
included to capture any unmeasured characteristics of the county that 
change over time. 
D. Empirical Results 
1. Regression procedure 
A two-stage least squares approach was applied to reduced-form 
equations. Such an approach was taken because of the use of total private 
school enrollments in the real expenditure equation. If OLS were applied 
to the reduced form for real expenditures, inconsistent estimates of the 
coefficients on the variables would result due to the fact that all of the 
regressors are not exogenous variables. Problems arise because total 
private school enrollment is too highly correlated with the error term in 
the real expenditure equation, e. Two-stage least squares is a solution 
to this type of problem. 
With two-stage least squares, an estimate for total private school 
enrollment is derived by regressing total private school enrollment on 
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Table 6.2. Sample statistics 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
White sample: 
REXPP 
RASSPP 
TPRIVTCH 
NCHTPOP 
MDWAGE 
ENR5560 
NPRIV 
PCTCATH 
Black sample: 
REXPP 
RASSPP 
TPRIVTCH 
NCHTPOP 
MDWAGE 
ENR5560 
NPRIV 
PCTCATH 
106.6946 
1.4844 
0.0819 
0.1094 
1.4365 
0.0199 
6.3820 
0.0949 
78.8544 
1.4917 
0.0833 
0.0349 
1.4365 
0.0204 
6.6153 
0.0977 
31.4125 
0.4759 
0.1055 
0.0281 
0.4544 
0.0268 
9.7170 
0.1354 
40.5243 
0.4827 
0.1063 
0.0253 
0.4544 
0.0273 
9.8720 
0.1378 
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real assets, number of private schools, percent of the population who are 
Catholic, the Maryland manufacturing wage, and trend. Since these 
variables are assumed exogenous, they will be uncorrelated with the error 
term in the real expenditure equation, c. Therefore, the estimate of 
total private school enrollment will be uncorrelated with e as well. If 
the estimates for private school enrollment are then used in the real 
expenditures regression, the estimates of the coefficients on the 
variables will no longer be inconsistent. 
Using two-stage least squares techniques, equation 6.2 was initially 
estimated over the 23 counties (white sample) and 22 counties (black 
sample) with no transformation of the data. It was assumed that the error 
term, an expected value of zero (5(6^^) = 0), had a constant 
variance, and E(ei^tGi,t+s) ~ ® for s # 0. The very low values of the 
Durbin-Watson statistics resulting from these estimations demonstrated 
that the assumption of the error terms being independent was violated. 
Even though the values obtained were quite high, low Durbin-Watson 
statistics implied that the data needed some type of transformation to 
eliminate the autocorrelation existing. To correct for the 
autocorrelation the Durbin two-step procedure was employed. [Maddala, 
1977, pp. 277-279] 
2. Durbin two-step procedure 
The presence of autocorrelation in time series data is quite common. 
The autocorrelation simply implies that the error term for a particular 
county at time t is functionally related to the error term for that county 
at time t-1. In the model for real expenditures this implies that: 
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®i,t = P®i,t-1 + ®i,t 
where 0 < p < 1. The e^ are serially 
variance, and E(e^) = 0. 
If equation 6.2 is lagged by one 
by p, and then the lagged equation is 
equation 6.5, the following results. 
(6.5) 
independent, have a constant 
time period, each term is multiplied 
subtracted from the original using 
REXPPi t = a(l-p) + pREXPPi^t-l+ GiRASSPP^^t + GipRASSPPi ^-1 + 
GgTPRIVTCHi^t + /32PTPRIVTCH^^t-l + A3NCHTPOP1 % + 
fi3pNCHTP0PjL^t-l + O^MDWAGEi^t + G^pMOWAGE^^t-l + 
G5ENR5560i^t +fl5pENR5560j_^ + BgTRENDj^^,. + e^^^ 
When equation 6.6 is estimated using ordinary least squares, the 
coefficient on the lagged real expenditure term can be used as an estimate 
of p. Prior to the estimation process, the 1928 observation for each 
county was omitted. This modification was necessary due to the nature of 
the data (cross-sectional, pooled over time). Failure to make such a 
modification would imply that the error term for an observation in some 
county A in 1928 would be functionally related to the error term of an 
observation in some county B in 1955. Such a functional relationship is 
not statistically justifiable. 
Obtaining the estimate for p is the first step of the two-step 
procedure. With this estimate determined, all of the original variables 
were transformed according to equation 6.7. 
Xi,t = *i,t - (PXi,t-l) (6.7) 
This transformation of the data Is the second step In Durbin's two-step 
procedure. Again, the 1928 observation was omitted for each variable in 
each county for the reasons stated above. The transformed data were then 
used in the two-stage least squares estimation of real expenditures for 
public schools. A statistical summary of these transformed data can be 
found in Table 6.3. 
3. Empirical findings vs. theoretical predications 
With the transformed data the model was run three times: once for 
the white sample, once for the black sample, and once for the combined 
sample (pooled sample). The combined sample was run to see if there was 
any information gained by looking at the samples separately or whether 
there were statistically significance differences in the way decision­
makers responded to exogenous influences in funding black and white 
schools. To test whether the coefficients vary across races, an F-test 
was performed. The result was an F-statistic equal to 94.95 (significance 
level 0.00). The F-statistic demonstrated that there was information to 
be gained by running the samples separately. The coefficients across 
samples could not be assumed to be the same. Therefore, the remainder of 
the empirical results are reported for the black and white samples only. 
The empirical results of the two-stage least squares regressions are 
reported in Tables 6.4 and 6.5. Table 6.4 reports the variable 
coefficients which are used in the equation which estimated total private 
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Table 6.3. Sample statistics for the transformed data 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
White sample: 
REXPP 
RASSPP 
TPRIVTCH 
NCHTPOP 
MDWAGE 
ENR5560 
NPRIV 
PCTCATH 
22.3694 
0.3095 
0.0046 
0.0226 
0.3004 
0.0041 
0.1937 
0.0028 
21.2064 
0.1980 
0.0054 
0.0099 
0.2362 
0.0085 
3.8783 
0.0358 
Black sample: 
REXPP 
RASSPP 
TPRIVTCH 
NCHTPOP 
MDWAGE 
ENR5560 
NPRIV 
PCTCATH 
6.8428 
0.1274 
0.0051 
0.0030 
0.1237 
0.0106 
0.2309 
0.0033 
26.7626 
0.1913 
0.0058 
0.0078 
0.2356 
0.0168 
3.9559 
0.0366 
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Table 6.4. First stage regression results, TPRIVTCH^, 1928-1955 
Independent White Black 
variable sample sample^ 
INTERCEPT 
TREND 
RASSPP 
NPRIV 
PCTCATH 
MDWA6E 
-0.1206E-02 
(-0.62) 
0.1041E-03 
( 2 . 2 6 )  
-0.4558E-02 
(-1.98) 
0.2642E-02 
(11.58) 
0.3235 
(5.93) 
-0.7147E-02 
(-3.01) 
-0.1481E-02 
(-0.72) 
0.1167E-03 
(2.40) 
-0.5009E-02 
(-2.09) 
0.2591E-02 
(11.15) 
0.3644 
(6.85) 
-0.7793E-02 
(-3.11) 
DW 
.29 
1.76 
621 
49.38 
.30 
1.73 
594 
51.21 
®t-statisticB in parentheses. 
^Dependent variable is total (both black and white) children enrolled 
in private schools. The only difference in the regression run for the 
black sample would be the number of counties included. (Garrett county is 
excluded from the black sample.) 
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Table 6.5. Second stage regression results, REXPPA^, 1928-1955 
Independent White Black 
variable sample sample 
INTERCEPT 
TREND 
TPRIVTCH 
RASSPP 
ENR5560 
NCHTPOP 
MOWAGE 
-17.4982 
(-6.64) 
0.9621 
(15.77) 
196.5585 
(2.67) 
25.9291 
(10.79) 
-384.5550 
(-5.72) 
-197.1247 
(-3.53) 
-1.6592 
( -0 .61 )  
-22.0028 
(-11.31) 
0.7090 
(15.61) 
246.3785 
(4.15) 
19.7462 
(9.32) 
-25.0980 
(-1.23) 
-323.1827 
(-2.37) 
3.8895 
(1.69) 
DW 
.45 
1.95 
621 
82.38 
.42 
2 . 2 8  
594 
70.14 
^t-statistics in parentheses. 
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school enrollment. The estimates from this regression were then used in 
the second stage of the two-stage least squares procedure to estimate real 
expenditures. Table 6.5 reports the variable coefficients for the real 
expenditures equation. In both sets of results, the Durbin-Watson 
statistics indicate that the data transformation has eliminated the 
autocorrelation that existed in the data. 
The two-stage least squares regression procedure worked well with 
this particular data set. Most of the variables selected for use in this 
model had the anticipated signs and possessed significant t-statistics. 
In particular, almost all of the regressors in the total private 
enrollment regression were predicted to have positive coefficients. 
In both the black and the white samples the number of private 
schools, NPRIV, and the percentage of the population who are Catholic, 
PCTCATH, had coefficients which were statistically significant with the 
anticipated positive signs. Real assets, RASSPP, and the proxy for the 
Maryland manufacturing wage, MDWAGE, had negative coefficients in both 
samples. The coefficients were significant in both samples as well. The 
coefficient on the MDWAGE variable demonstrated that the wage was 
considered to be a measure of the cost of education. 
The second stage of the two-stage least squares procedure also 
produced statistically significant results. The regressions for the real 
expenditures showed coefficients with most of the anticipated signs. In 
both regressions, real assets, RASSPP, and private school enrollments, 
TPRIVTCH, had positive coefficients which were significant. Using the 
quantity/quality idea that the number of children and a percent of the 
total population should act as a price for education proved to be a good 
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choice. The coefficient on this variable, NCHTPOP, was negative and 
significant in both the black and the white equations proving NCHTPOP a 
good proxy for the price of public education. The wage variable, MDWAGE, 
had a positive coefficient for the black sample and a negative coefficient 
for the white sample. The coefficient was not statistically significant 
in the white regression and only marginally significant (t = 1.69) in 
black regression. 
The taste for discrimination variable, ENR5560, did work as 
anticipated in the black sample. A taste for discrimination on the part 
of whites in a community (revealed in the "white flight" after the 
segregated era ended) was expected to be negatively related to 
expenditures on black public schools. Such a negative relationship did 
exist. It was not statistically significant, however. The expected 
positive sign on the coefficient of the same variable in the white sample 
did not result. The coefficient was negative and significant. In other 
words, counties experiencing the largest increases in proportional private 
school enrollments following the Brown vs. Topeka Board of Education 
decision had low levels of per-pupil expenditures in both the black and 
the white schools systems over the 1928 - 1955 period. 
4. Elasticities 
The results from the two-stage least squares regressions were used to 
calculate elasticities among the variables. Although the data were not in 
logarithm form when the regressions were run, simple elasticity 
calculations were possible. The values were calculated at the mean value 
of the variables according to the following formula. 
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% A y (A y / ?) Ay 5c 
• — = 0% '  (X / y) 
Ax 7 
 
% A X (A X / 5?) 
( 6 . 8 )  
By is the coefficient on the x term in the regression for variable y. 
Using this formula the elasticity values found in Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 
were calculated. 
All of the elasticity estimates that were calculated were found to be 
inelastic. The fact that they are inelastic may seem strange given that 
many of the elasticity values calculated in previous chapters were 
elastic. However, the previous measures were dynamic in nature, meaning 
that they measured the percentage change in a variable over time rather 
than at a point in time. The measures found here are not dynamic in 
nature, so these results are by no means inconsistent with the previous 
measures. 
From the elasticity values it can be seen that the percentage of 
Catholic persons in the population had the greatest impact on the total 
number of students enrolled in private schools relative to the county 
population. The availability of private schools had the next greatest 
impact. The Maryland wage was followed by real assets per person. These 
results would seem to imply that enrollment in private schools is more an 
issue of taste than it is a fiscal issue. (Elasticity values for total 
private school enrollments would not differ significantly for the black 
and the white samples. See footnote b. Table 6.4.) 
The findings differed somewhat for the black and white samples with 
regard to the elasticity calculations for real expenditures per pupil 
belonging. In both samples, real assets had the highest elasticity value. 
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Table 6.6. Estimates of elasticities for total private school enrollments 
relative to the total population, (TPRIVTCH) 
Black and White 
Variable sample 
RASSPP -0.09 
NPRIV 0.22 
PCTCATH 0.38 
MDWAGE -0.15 
Table 6.7. Estimates of elasticities for real expenditures on public 
schools per pupil belonging, (REXPP) 
Variable 
White 
sample 
Black 
sample 
RASSPP 0.36 0.37 
NCHTPOP -0.20 -0.14 
TPRIVTCH 0.04 0.19 
MDWAGE -0.02 0.07 
ENR5560 -0.07 -0.06 
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For whites, the number of white children relative to the county population 
had the next greatest impact on real expenditures. This was followed by 
the change in private school enrollment from 1955 to 1960, the total 
number of children enrolled in private schools relative to the total 
number of children in the county, and the Maryland wage in the white 
sample. For the black sample, real assets were followed by the total 
number of children enrolled in private schools relative to the total 
number of children in the county, the total number of black children 
relative to the county population, the Maryland wage, and then the change 
in private school enrollment from 1955 to 1960. 
B. Conclusions 
The approach taken to investigate the public-private school choice 
with a taste for discrimination included was a more traditional one. 
Although the model used was static rather than dynamic, the results were 
not much different than what was anticipated from previous empirical work. 
A little different approach had to be taken in terms of transforming 
the data, but the Durbin two-step corrected the autocorrelation problems 
that existed. The transformed data produced some nice results which were 
statistically sound. 
The taste for discrimination variable derived using the idea of 
revealed preference did not have the impact anticipated. To test whether 
it was the specific time period being used (1928 - 1955) which affected 
the results, a sample of only years 1945 to 1955 (a time period nearer to 
Brown vs. Topeka Board of Education) was used. The same regressions were 
run, but the results were very much the same for the "nearer" time period 
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than the entire time span. These results are reported in Tables 6.8 and 
6.9. The coefficients on the ENR5560 did behave a little more as expected 
with these regressions. Although the sign on the ENR5560 coefficient was 
still negative in the white regression, it was not significant. The 
regression for the black sample showed the anticipated negative sign on 
the ENR5560 coefficient and it was significant which was not true in the 
previous regressions. The Maryland wage variable took on a positive, 
significant coefficient in the white regression for REXPPA. RASSPP, the 
real assets variable kept the positive coefficient, but lost its 
significance in the REXPPA regressions. Overall, many of the coefficients 
had t-statistics which decreased in value. 
The elasticity estimates that were calculated (for the first set of 
regressions) were found to be inelastic. At first glance, this would 
appear to be inconsistent with the previous estimates calculated from the 
VAR models. However, given that the estimates from the VAR were 
calculated by summing over either 5 or 14 years, these results are not 
inconsistent in the least. To test whether there was inconsistency, the 
VAR data were used to approximate static elasticity measures. To 
accomplish this the initial impulse response due to a particular shock was 
used as in the numerator component of the elasticity measure (rather than 
the summation of impulse responses over time). The shock value was used 
in the denominator component. These static approximations from VAR data 
were quite consistent with the estimates in this chapter. 
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Table 6.8. First stage regression results, TPRIVTCH*, 1945-1955 
Independent 
variable 
White 
sample 
Black 
sample^ 
INTERCEPT 
TREND 
RASSPP 
NPRIV 
PCTCATH 
MDWAGE 
0.2771E-01 
(2.14) 
-0.4412E-03 
(-1.69) 
-0.1196E-01 
(-1.90) 
0.2228E-02 
(7.15) 
0.1870 
(1.34) 
-0.4967B-02 
(-1.45) 
0.2967E-01 
( 2 . 1 8 )  
-0.4736E-03 
(-1.73) 
-0.1305E-01 
(-2.00) 
0.2117E-02 
( 6 . 6 6 )  
0;2880 
(2.11) 
-0.5367E-02 
(-1.48) 
DW 
.32 
1.35 
230 
20.65 
.32 
1.32 
220 
20.55 
®t-statistics in parentheses. 
^Dependent variable is total (both black and white) children enrolled 
in private schools. The only difference in the regression run for the 
black sample would be the number of counties included. (Garrett county is 
excluded from the black sample.) 
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Table 6.9. Second stage regression results, REXPPA^, 1945-1955 
Independent 
variable 
White 
sample 
Black 
sample 
INTERCEPT 
TREND 
TPRIVTCH 
RASSPP 
ENR5560 
NCHTPOP 
MDWAGE 
-45.4478 
(-2.96) 
1.4976 
(4.57) 
207.4948 
(1.56) 
5.3801 
(0 .80)  
-212.1660 
(-1.58) 
-245.2825 
(-2.24) 
18.9105 
(4.27) 
-55.5060 
(-3.74) 
1.3635 
(4.56) 
349.6994 
(2.78) 
8.1472 
(1.15) 
-2.4854 
(-3.41) 
-394.0345 
(-1.24) 
12.3122 
(3.06) 
DW 
.24 
2.12 
230 
11.98 
.25 
2.12 
220 
11.66 
^t-statistics in parentheses. 
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viz. summary 
A. Overview of the Empirical Results 
Chapter III was successful in estimating the causal relationships 
among real expenditures per pupil in public schools, average daily 
attendance in the public schools, the rate of births per thousand in the 
population, and real assets per person in the population. F-statistics 
showed that in the white sample all four variables were significant in 
determining each other. For the black sample, all variables were 
significant in determining real expenditures, attendance, and real assets. 
Real expenditures and attendance were found not to be significant in 
determining the birth rate. In the combined sample, only attendance was 
insignificant in the birth rate equation. Significant F-statistics 
implied that causality ran in both direction for most variables or that a 
feedback effect was present. 
Impulse responses were then generated to simulate the system's 
response to shocks in each of the variables. From these impulse responses 
it was possible to create dynamic elasticity measures. These elasticity 
measures showed characteristics of the Tiebout migration model, the 
median-voter model, the quantity/quality model, the human capital 
investment model, and the capitalization model. No one model seemed to be 
predominate. Given that no one particular model has been decided upon by 
the literature as the "best" model to describe the educational investment 
process, this finding was expected. 
The most intriguing result of the dynamic elasticity measures was the 
response of real assets to shocks in school attendance. In each of the 
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samples, real assets demonstrated a very elastic positive dynamic response 
to increases in attendance (for both T=5 and T=14). This result supported 
the claim that there was incentive to invest in the education of both 
blacks and white, even in an era of segregation. More education implied 
that the value of a community's assets increased. 
Chapter IV examined the public-private school decision and tested 
whether various causal relationships presented in the literature held 
true. This investigation was an extension of the investigation in chapter 
III and was performed using the same methodology found in that chapter. 
The empirical findings indicated that real expenditures and real assets 
were not significant in causing private school enrollments in all samples. 
Although attendance in public schools was found to be insignificant in 
causing total private school enrollments in both the white and the black, 
samples, it was significant in the combined sample. Private school 
enrollments were found to cause real expenditures in the white and 
combined samples, but not in the black sample. Private school enrollments 
were also found to be significant in causing real assets in the white 
sample, marginally significant in the combined sample, and insignificant 
in the black sample. In all three samples, private school enrollments 
were insignificant in causing public school attendance. The remainder of 
the variables demonstrated the same type of causal relationships as 
presented in chapter III. 
Impulse responses and dynamic elasticity measures were also 
calculated in this chapter. Real assets in the white sample showed a 
positive elastic response to increases in private school enrollments. 
Real assets also showed a positive elastic response to increases in public 
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school attendance in all three sample. Cross-elasticity values among the 
other variables were comparable to the values in chapter III. 
The causal relationships determined in chapters III and IV along with 
the theory developed in chapter V were used to formulate a reduced-form 
equations model which was empirically tested in chapter VI. This model 
incorporated variables used in the previous empirical analyses, but 
further included the number of children in the population, a proxy for the 
Maryland manufacturing wage, the percentage of the population who are 
Catholic, the number of private schools, and a taste for discrimination 
variable. 
A two-stage least squares approach was applied to the reduced-form 
equations. The regression results for total private school enrollments 
gave the anticipated positive coefficients on the number of private 
schools variable and on the percent Catholic variable. The negative 
coefficient on the Maryland wage variable was somewhat expected, but not 
on the real assets variable. All of the coefficients in the private 
school enrollments regression were significant. 
The second stage was to estimate real expenditures in the public 
school systems. Most of the coefficients had the anticipated signs and 
were significant. The Maryland wage variable had a negative coefficient 
in the white sample and a positive one in the black sample. These 
coefficients were, however, insignificant. The coefficient on the 
discrimination variable had the anticipated negative sign in the black 
sample, but the coefficient was not significant. In the white sample the 
coefficient was expected to be positive, but the results were negative and 
significant. 
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B. An Overview of the Theoretical Model 
A theoretical model which explains the educational investment 
decision from both a firm's perspective and a household's perspective was 
derived in chapter V. The goal of the model was twofold. First, the 
model was to explain why there was an incentive for white-dominated school 
systems to invest in education for white and black children alike, and 
hence provide a possible explanation for Myrdal's paradox. Second, the 
model was to explain why property values would rise if there were 
increases in attendance. A two-period model was developed which included 
a representative profit-maximizing firm and a representative utility-
maximizing household. 
The model demonstrated that there were pecuniary benefits to the firm 
by investing in education. The model further demonstrated that if there 
were an unanticipated shock in attendance due to unanticipated investment 
by a household (a change in a household's taste pattern for education), 
wages would be unable to incorporate the unanticipated investment and 
firms would reap the economic benefits in terms of increased profits. 
These increased profits would then be capitalized into property values. 
C. General Conclusions and Future Research 
Although the approach taken to study investment in education was not 
"traditional" in nature, the main goal of the dissertation has been met. 
Causal relationships among educational investment variables have been 
estimated and then compared and contrasted to the findings of the 
literature and the predictions of theory. Even after all the empirical 
was performed, the final conclusion is still that no one model best 
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describes the educational investment process, characteristics of each of 
the models have merit. 
The causal relationship between school attendance and property values 
shown in the empirical results as well as in the theoretical derivations, 
present one explanation for Myrdal's paradox. This explanation was 
originally suggested by Freeman, but no one to date had presented economic 
theory in support of such an explanation or had empirically tested such a 
possible solution to the paradox. 
The results of this study suggest that there are several areas for 
possible future research. While this study did incorporate discrimination 
into the investigation of educational investment, an extension to this 
study would be to find a better method of incorporating it into the 
theoretical and empirical models. An extension for further study would be 
to locate and incorporate additional variables such as actual consumer 
income, state and federal aid to school districts, tuition of private 
schools as well as other variables which might help to better explain the 
educational investment process. 
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